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PUNISHING CHILDREN IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
Cynthia V. Ward*
INTRODUCTION
Consider the facts in this attempted murder case, which Califor-
nia prosecutors filed in 1996:
Defendant told a witness that the victim's family "looked at him
wrong," and that in return he, Defendant, "had to kill the baby."' De-
fendant and two acquaintances then went to the victim's apartment
when the victim's parents were out grocery shopping and had left
their infant son with his eighteen-year-old stepsister, who was in the
bathroom and did not hear Defendant and his friends enter the
house. 2 Defendant went to the baby's bedroom, took the baby, four-
week-old Ignacio Bermudez, out of his bassinet, dropped him on the
floor, and proceeded to beat the infant in the head with his fists, feet,
and a stick. Defendant and his accomplices then stole property from
the house and departed. After the assault, Defendant threatened a
female witness with harm if she reported the incident. Defendant
then told a family member about the attack; the family member re-
ported him to the authorities. Questioned about the attack, Defen-
dant first lied about it, then eventually re-enacted the assault in a
videotaped interview with police. 3
Doctors determined that Ignacio Bermudez had suffered "global"
brain damage from the attack. 4 Eighteen months after the assault, the
baby was unable to see, walk, or make intelligible sounds.5 According
to a media report at the time, "Doctors say nothing less than a miracle
© 2006 Cynthia V. Ward. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
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will restore Ignacio to health."
'6 California prosecutors described De-
fendant as the "ringleader" in the attack and charged 
him with at-
tempted murder.
7 The defense did not dispute the essential 
facts. 8
Is Defendant guilty?
Now consider one additional fact: at the time of 
his assault on
Ignacio Bermudez, Defendant was six years old.
9 Should the single
circumstance of age make a difference to 
Defendant's guilt or
punishment?
For most of the twentieth century the law's answer 
was "yes." Pre-
adolescent offenders, even violent ones, were routinely 
found not re-
sponsible and were instead routed through the 
non-punitive juvenile
system, which emphasized treatment and rehabilitation 
over blame.
But the "youth excuse" has come under strong 
attack in response to
high levels of public concern over the violent and 
harmful actions of
young defendants.' 0 Over the past two decades the 
states have signifi-
cantly revamped their criminal codes to make it 
easier to punish chil-
dren who commit violent offenses." The fact that 
a six-year-old was
6 Mary Curtius, Life of Tears and Hopefor Beaten Baby's Family, 




9 Id. Because of his juvenile status, Defendant's full name 
was not used in the
media, which referred to him only as "Brandon 
T."
10 For example, in a television interview, former 
California Governor Pete Wilson
explained: "We cannot ignore the fact that there 
are kids ... who are committing
violent adult felonies, and we cannot tolerate it. 
And youth is no excuse for commit-
ting murder, robbery, rape, home invasions, or 
for terrorizing entire neighborhoods."
NewsHour withfim Lehrer:JuvenileJustice (PBS television broadcast 
Feb. 29, 2000), avail-
able at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/youth/Jan-juneOO/justice_2-29.html. 
Con-
trary to the impression one sometimes receives 
from scholarship in the field, this view
has been recently expressed not only in the United 
States but also in Europe. See, e.g.,
Home Office, No More Excuses: A New Approach 
to Tackling Youth Crime in En-
gland and Wales (Nov. 30, 1997), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/Jou-no-
more-excuses?wiel=html. ("An excuse culture has developed 
within the youth justice
system. It excuses itself for its inefficiency, and 
too often excuses the young offenders
before it, implying that they cannot help their 
behaviour because of their social cir-
cumstances .... The system allows them to go 
on wrecking their own lives as well as
disrupting their families and communities.").
11 See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie & Thomas Grisso, 
Adjudicative Competence and Youth-
ful Offenders, in YouTH ON TRIAL 73, 84 (Thomas Grisso & Robert 
G. Schwartz eds.,
2000) ("Alarmed by an increase in violent offenses (especially 
gun homicides) by
juveniles, most states during the past decade revised their 
codes pertaining to the
adjudication of youths charged with serious and violent offenses."); 
Carrie S. Fried &
N. Dickon Reppucci, Criminal Decision Making: The Development 
of Adolescent Judgment,
Criminal Responsibility, and Culpability, 25 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 45, 45-46 (2001) ("The
1980s and 1990s were characterized by increasingly 
adult-like treatment ofjuveniles in
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actually charged with attempted murder 12 reflects the change in atti-
tude that underlies this trend: twenty years ago even the most serious
cases involving children under seven were adjudicated in juvenile
court, and in a non-punitive fashion.1 3 The law has changed dramati-
cally, to the point where some states now allow judicial waiver of chil-
dren into adult court at any age, at least when the child is charged
with a serious offense. 14 And in a small but growing number of cases,
adult-sized punishment is in fact being inflicted-even when it in-
volves a sentence of life without parole.1 5
The issue of punishing children for crime has exposed a divide
between the political actors who design and enforce the law, and
the court system and increased focus on the protection of the community rather than
the protection of the juvenile defendant. Between 1992 and 1995, forty-one states
enacted laws making it easier to prosecute juveniles in adult criminal court. Other
legislative mechanisms that emphasize punishment over rehabilitation ofjuveniles in-
clude minimum sentencing requirements, blended sentencing that allowsjuveniles to
be sentenced past the age of twenty one years, and revision of confidentiality provi-
sions in favor of more open proceedings and records." (citing MELISSA SICKMUND ET
AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICrIMS (1997))).
12 The court in the case dropped the charge to assault with intent to do bodily
harm, before eventually deciding that the defendant, known in public only as Bran-
don T., was not competent to stand trial. Frontline: Little Criminals (PBS television
broadcast May 13, 1997), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbb/pages/frontline/
shows/little/etc/script.htnl; see infra Part I.A.2.b.
13 See, e.g., Lara A. Bazelon, Note, Exploding the Superpredator Myth: Why Infancy Is
the Preadolescent's Best Defense in Juvenile Court, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 159, 173-80 (2000)
(recounting the history of infancy defense in juvenile court).
14 See, e.g., Lisa Beresford, Note, Is Lowering the Age at Wich Juveniles Can Be
Transferred to Adult Criminal Court the Answer to Juvenile Crime? A State-by-State Assessment,
37 SAN DIEGO L. RFv. 783, 800 n.135 (2000) (citing as examples the states of Alaska,
Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, and South Carolina).
15 See, e.g., LYNN COTHERN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COORDINATING COUNCIL ON
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION 10 (2000), available at http://ArWW.
ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/184748.pdf ("The justice system's recent shift toward
stronger punishment policies has been marked not only by increased use of the death
penalty but by increases in the number of offenders-including juveniles who com-
mitted offenses prior to their 18th birthdays-being sentenced to life in prison with-
out the possibility of parole .... The overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions
allow life without parole for offenders younger than age 16. Some even make it
mandatory for defendants convicted of certain offenses in criminal court. In Wash-
ington State, offenders as young as 8 can be sentenced to life. In Vermont, 10-year-
olds can face the sentence." (footnotes omitted)). In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
574 (2005), of course, the United States Supreme Court held that defendants who
were under age eighteen at the time of their crimes may not be sentenced to death.
See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
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those in the academy who evaluate its justification and effect. 16 The
law itself has moved strongly and consistently in the direction of con-
victing and punishing juveniles who commit violent offenses. Politi-
cians speak loudly in favor of "send jing] a message to violent
criminals of all ages"1 7 and of "'putting these juvenile criminals where
they need to be-behind bars in the adult prisons."' 1 8 Although legis-
lators often cite the values of deterrence and public protection as rea-
sons for the punitive turn toward juveniles,1 9 the angry tone of the
debate also signals the presence of a strong retributive impulse.20
16 See, e.g., David 0. Brink, Immaturity, Normative Competence, and Juvenile Transfer:
How (Not) to Punish Minors for Major Crimes, 82 TEx. L. REv. 1555, 1569-73 (2004);
Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEx. L. REV. 799, 829-39
(2003); Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of Development, 14 STAN. L. & POL'V
REv. 143, 158-73 (2003).
17 John Caher, Rhetoric and Reality in the Pataki Era, TIMES UNION (Albany), Jan.
18, 1998, at A6 (quoting New York Governor George Pataki); see also Michael Finne-
gan, Governor Urges Hard Hits on Young Criminals, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 10, 1995, at 8
(quoting Governor Pataki's statement: "It's time we take that same tough approach to
juvenile crime that we take to violent crime in general.").
18 Mark Hollis, House Weighs Treating 16-, 17-year-olds as Adults, S. FLA. SUN-SENTI-
NEL, Mar. 30, 2000, at 1B. (quoting Sandy Murman, Florida State Representative); see
also David Judson, Juvenile Crime Legislation Expanded, Not Stiffened, GANNETr NEWS SER-
VICE, Oct. 21, 1998 ("The main initiative to fail amid the last-minute horse-trading [in
the U.S. Congress] was a proposal sponsored chiefly by Rep. Bill McCollum, R.-Fla.,
and Sen. Orrin Hatch, R.-Utah, that would have provided states as much as $2.5 bil-
lion over five years to crack down on juvenile crime, add judges and build new youth
lockups. The price of the aid, however, required states to adopt rules encouraging
prosecutors to try more juveniles as adults, and in cases of particularly heinous crimes,
seek the death penalty for offenders as young as 15.").
19 For example, Florida state senator Gary Siegel, R.-Longwood, who favored pas-
sage of a new bill that "cracks down" on juvenile crime, was quoted as saying:
Juveniles all over the state are aware of what we're doing and they want to see how
we're going to address this epidemic increase in crime. They are waiting for our
signal." Curtis Krueger, Senate Passes Juvenile Crime Bill Unanimously, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Mar. 10, 1994, at 4B; see also Caher, supra note 17 ("'Let's send a message to
violent criminals of all ages: If you assault our people, you will land in prison."' (quot-
ing George E. Pataki, New York Governor)).
20 See, e.g., Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 807. Scott and Steinberg explain
that the trend toward punishing juveniles criminally "has features of moral panic" and
that "the elements of a moral panic include an intense community concern (often
triggered by a publicized incident) that is focused on deviant behavior, an exagger-
ated perception of the seriousness of the threat and the number of offenders, and
collective hostility toward the offenders, who are perceived as outsiders threatening
the community. Id.; see also Bazelon, supra note 13, at 179 ("The current wave of
crime reform is characterized by the sentiment that the punishment should fit the
crime, not the criminal. This 'just deserts' approach is designed to 'crack[ ] down
especially hard on juvenile offenders,' whom many believe 'are now coddled by a
[VOL. 82:1
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But the punitive turn toward young offenders conflicts head-on
with the received view of legal scholars that important differences be-
tween children and adults-and even between older adolescents and
adults-mandate separate, and gentler, treatment of juveniles who
commit serious crimes.2'
Considerable irony attends this debate. In the 1970s and 1980s, a
vocal "Children's Rights" movement argued passionately for the pro-
position that adolescents were as competent as adults to make many
important life decisions, including the decisions to drink alcohol, to
consent to medical treatment, and to have an abortion without con-
sulting a parent.22 Accompanying this movement were behavioral
studies purporting to discover that, in important and legally relevant
respects, the cognitive capacities of adolescents equal those of
adults23:
Contrary to the stereotype of adolescents as markedly egocentric,
for example, or as handicapped by deficiencies in logical ability,
studies show that adolescents (at least, from age fifteen on) are no
more likely than adults to suffer from the "personal fable" (the be-
lief that one's behavior is somehow not governed by the same rules
justice system that clings to a discredited belief in rehabilitation."' (quoting ELLIOT
CURRIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMEIcA 4 (1998))).
21 See, e.g., Brink, supra note 16, at 1557 ("For a variety of reasons, juveniles tend
to be less competent in discriminating right from wrong and in being able to regulate
successfully their actions in accord with these discriminations. If they are less compe-
tent, then [on a retributive theory of punishment] they are less responsible. But then
the trend to try juveniles as adults mistakenly assesses the punishment juveniles de-
serve by the wrong or harm they have done, ignoring their diminished responsibility
for this wrong or harm."); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 801 ("Using the tools of
developmental psychology, we examine two important dimensions of adolescence
that distinguish this group from adults in ways that are important to criminal culpabil-
ity. Because these developmental factors influence their criminal choices, young
wrongdoers are less blameworthy than adults under conventional criminal law con-
ceptions of mitigation."); Bazelon, supra note 13, at 163 ("Only by retaining the dis-
tinctions between the mental capacities of preteenage children on the one hand, and
adolescents, or fully mature adults on the other, can juvenile courts ensure that the
sanctions imposed are consistent with fundamental notions of fairness and due pro-
cess.); see also Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 11, at 93-98 (arguing on grounds both of
competence and culpability that children and adolescents should not be held as re-
sponsible as adults who commit facially similar offenses).
22 See Donald L. Beschle, The Juvenile Justice Counterrevolution: Responding to Cogni-
tive Dissonance in the Law's View of the Decision-Making Capacity of Minors, 48 EMORY L.J.
65, 91-92 (1999).
23 Young children-those under the age of ten-were generally excepted from
these findings; with respect to them, it was generally conceded that cognitive differ-
ences did justify different treatment from that accorded to adults. See, e.g., Brink,
supra note 16, at 1570; Bazelon, supra note 13, at 163.
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of nature that apply to everyone else, as when a cigarette smoker
believes that he is immune to the health effects of smoking) and no
less likely than adults to employ rational algorithms in decision-
making situations. In fact, there is substantial evidence that adoles-
cents are well aware of the risks they take .... 24
The authors go on to note that "[t] hese findings about a relative
lack of differences between adolescents and adults were used by youth
advocates in the 1980s to argue for the expansion of the rights af-
forded to minors. In particular, independent access to abortion was
at the center of a vigorous moral, political, and legal debate."25
Based in large part on the lack of differences found in the in-
formed consent literature, a number of psychologists supported the
adolescent autonomy position.26 In its amicus brief in the Supreme
Court case of Hodgson v. Minnesota,27 for example, the American Psy-
chological Association (APA) cited abundant studies supporting the
claim thatjuveniles possess sufficient maturity to decide, without adult
consultation, whether or not to have an abortion,2 8 "[Bly middle ado-
lescence (age 14-15)," the APA report concluded, "young people de-
velop abilities similar to adults in reasoning about moral dilemmas,
understanding social rules and laws, [and] reasoning about interper-
sonal relationships and interpersonal problems .... -29
When, in the 1990s, such research formed the basis for the argu-
ment that adolescents ought not only to be accorded rights, but also
24 Elizabeth Cauffman et al., justice forJuveniles: New Perspectives on Adolescents' Com-
petence and Culpability, 18 QUINNIPIc L. REV. 403, 407 (1999) (citing Marilyn Jacobs-
Quadrel et al., Adolescent (In)vulnerability, 48 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 102 (1993)).
25 Id. at 408.
26 Id. at 408-09; see also Fried & Reppucci, supra note 11, at 46 ("Adolescent deci-
sion making has been studied in several legally relevant contexts, including compe-
tence to make abortion decisions, consent to medical treatment and waiver of
Miranda rights. In general, these studies have found that, past the age of 14 years,
adolescents are competent decision makers under the informed-consent model as
long as they are of average or above-average intelligence." (citations omitted) (citing
THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS (1981); Bruce Ambuel & Julian Rap-
paport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents' Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent
to Abortion, 16 L. & Hum. BEHAV. 129 (1992); Louis A. Weithorn, Children's Capacities in
Legal Contexts, in CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW (N. Dickon Reppucci et al.
eds., 1984))).
27 497 U.S. 417, 457-58 (1990) (striking down state law requiring that minor fe-
males notify both parents and then wait forty-eight hours before having an abortion as
unconstitutional because it was not reasonably related to legitimate state interests).
28 Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Petitioner/Cross-Respondent at 18-20, Hodson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990)
(Nos. 88-1125 & 88-1309).
29 Id. at 19 (footnotes omitted).
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assigned responsibility (including criminal responsibility) for their be-
havior, the children's movement found that studies demonstrating the
substantially equal capacities of adolescents and adults
proved to be a double-edged sword. How could adolescents be ma-
ture enough to make their own decisions about abortion, but not
mature enough to face the consequences of committing armed rob-
bery or using marijuana? The very existence of a separate justice
system forjuveniles is predicated in part on the assumption that the
basic competencies of adolescents and adults differ in fundamental
ways that affect judgment. If adolescents and adults are equally ca-
pable decision-makers, the argument that adolescents suffer from
"diminished responsibility" is called into question. Indeed, the very
same evidence that had been used to advocate for young people's
autonomy in medical decision-making could provide-and has pro-
vided for recent calls to treat juvenile delinquents as adults within
our legal and penal systems. 30
The argument against juvenile liability becomes even more diffi-
cult when one considers that the threshold capacities required for
criminal responsibility may well be lower than those required compe-
tently to exercise some rights for which children's advocates have
fought. As Professor Stephen Morse has insightfully explained, the
crimes for which children are subject to punishment as adults are al-
most always intentional crimes involving the knowing infliction of seri-
ous harm on a victim.3 1 Adolescents as well as adult offenders know
that the acts do inflict such harm.3 2 It seems facially incoherent to
argue (1) that the adolescent who intentionally shoots and kills his
teacher should not be held responsible because he lacks even the fun-
damental capacity to realize that shooting someone will inflict serious
30 Cauffman, et al., supra note 24, at 408-09.
31 Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CiuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
15, 53-54 (1997) ("Adolescent criminal conduct for the most part involves the inten-
tional infliction of harm: the offender intentionally killed, inflicted grievous bodily
harm, raped, stole, destroyed, or burned. That is, it is the adolescent's conscious
objective to cause in the immediate future precisely the harm the law prohibits. Un-
less serious adolescent offenders are specially unlucky or unskillful, they are practi-
cally certain to produce the harm that is their conscious objective, and they know
it."). This is not always the case, of course. For example, a case in New York this
spring involved a nine-year-old charged with manslaughter for stabbing her girlfriend
to death during a dispute over a ball. Associated Press, Girl, 9, Charged with Stabbing
l1-year-old Pal, May 31, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8044197 (last visited
Sept. 29, 2006).
32 See, e.g., Morse, supra note 31, at 54. ("The intentional harmdoer knows that
the conduct invades the interests of others; those interests may be given little value or
otherwise ignored or rationalized away, but they must be present to the adolescent's
mind.").
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harm, and (2) that adolescents as a class have sufficient maturity and
judgment to decide whether or not to have an abortion. Reduced to
its essentials, the claim seems to be that adolescents should be treated
as adults for the purposes of distributing rights and benefits, and as
children for the purposes of assigning responsibility and punishment.
But what justifies that view? Since the very same traits and characteris-
tics-the capacity for instrumental reasoning, an appreciation of the
consequences of acting, the ability to assess the moral underpinnings
of one's decision-undergird the arguments for rights and for respon-
sibilities, it is difficult to see what principle or principles support such
a theory.
Nonetheless, a burgeoning literature seeks routes around this
problem, arguing against equal treatment of adolescents in the crimi-
nal law and for the retention of a rule that distinguishes children as a
class and treats them as non-culpable, or less culpable, for their other-
wise criminal offenses. 33 The scholarship does this either by making
the case that the studies so heavily relied upon by the children's au-
tonomy movement were, after all, badly flawed;3 4 or by arguing that
even if those studies were not inherently flawed on their own terms,
they did not take account of all relevant adolescent differences, and
that once such additional differences are considered, it becomes clear
that adolescents should not be criminally punished on the same terms
as adults. 35 Most recently, scholars holding this view have hailed the
33 See, e.g., Brink, supra note 16, at 1585; Cauffman et al., supra note 24, at 404;
Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 801; Bazelon, supra note 13, at 162.
34 See, e.g., Cauffman et al., supra note 24, at 406-07 ("Most studies of cognitive
development that used the informed consent framework have found few major differ-
ences between adults and youth about fifteen years of age and older. However, the
foundation of this empirical work is fragile, as most of the investigations suffer from
various methodological limitations, including small, unrepresentative, usually white,
middle class samples of youth taking part in laboratory studies rather than in studies
that compare adolescent and adult performance under conditions that adequately
resemble daily life."); id. at 408 ("Based in large part on the lack of differences found
in the informed consent literature, a number of psychologists supported the adoles-
cent autonomy advocates' position. Their assessment of the research was not unani-
mously supported, however, as critics warned that the limitations of extant research
failed to justify strong policy arguments about adolescents' equivalence to adults.");
id. at 411 ("It is our position that the conclusion that adolescent judgment is
equivalent to that of adults is both tenuous and ill suited for legal policymaking.").
35 See, e.g., id. at 411 ("We posit that if psychosocial factors are taken into consid-
eration in addition to the cognitive factors that are typically assessed, significant dif-
ferences between adolescents and adults will emerge. Such differences reflect
genuine differences in capacities ... [that] provide a psychological basis for drawing
legal distinctions between adolescents and adults."); Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence
Steinberg, Researching Adolescents'Judgment and Culpability, in YouTH ON TRIAL, supra
[VOL. 8 2:1
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arrival of brain-imaging studies that trace the behavioral differences
between adolescents and adults to differences in brain development
between the two groups.3 6 In 2005 the United States Supreme Court
entered the fray, holding in the case of Roper v. Simmon 3 7 that a de-
fendant who was not yet eighteen at the time he committed inten-
tional murder could not constitutionally be executed for his crime
because, in large part, relevant differences between juveniles and
adults make the former less culpable for crime.38 To the extent that
the Court's rationale transcends the specific context of capital punish-
ment,39 the Court has joined forces with the scholarly wing of the de-
bate and, in a meaningful sense, divided the law from itself.
In general, the "difference" scholars have limited their discussion
to comparing adolescents with adults. Most take as a starting assump-
tion that young children should not be held criminally responsible
under any circumstances. Thus, in general the debate in the litera-
note 11, at 325, 326-37 (differences in adolescents' "maturity of judgment" may jus-
tify different treatment by the criminal law); Elizabeth Scott, Criminal Responsibility in
Adolescence: Lessons from Developmental Psychology, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 11, at
291, 293 (differences in adolescent decision-making capacity justify different treat-
ment by the criminal law). At a couple of points, Elizabeth Scott and Laurence Stein-
berg suggest that those who believe juveniles should be held responsible for crime
may be motivated by racism. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 809 ("A troub-
ling explanation for the puzzling hostility toward young law violators is that attitudes
are driven by racial and ethnic bias."); id. at 837 ("A developmentally-informed
boundary constraining decisionmakers represents a collective pre-commitment to rec-
ognizing the mitigating character of youth in assigning blame. This concern is criti-
cal, given the evidence that illegitimate racial and ethnic biases influence attitudes
about the punishment of young offenders and that decisionmakers appear to dis-
count the mitigating impact of immaturity in minority youths.").
36 See, e.g., Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd, Neurobiology and the
Law: A Role inJuvenileJustice?, 3 Omo ST.J. CRIM. L. 321, 327 (2006); Kevin W. Saun-
ders, A Disconnect Between Law and Neuroscience: Modern Brain Science, Media Influences,
and Juvenile Justice, 2005 UTAH L. Riv. 695, 697-98 ("[Nlew understandings of the
developing brain lead to the conclusion that children should not be subject to the
same sorts of punishment that may be appropriate for adult offenders."); see also infra
text accompanying notes 123-26 (concluding that studies alone cannot determine
when to hold someone criminally responsible).
37 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
38 Id. at 569-75 (detailing differences between juveniles and adults that, in the
Court's view, lessen the criminal culpability of the former).
39 It may not. As the basis for its holding the Court discussed differences between
juveniles and adults that, in its view, explained why defendants under the age of eigh-
teen "cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders"-that is, among
those offenders who merit the death penalty. Id. at 553. The Court did not address
the question of whether juvenile offenders should be criminally liable at all. Id. at
569.
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ture focuses on whether offenders of age fourteen or older ought to
be excluded from criminal liability as a class.40
But this age-circumscribed discussion, while important in some
ways, ultimately fails to engage either the dimensions or the nation-
wide attraction of the punitive turn toward children in the criminal
law. As noted above, that move toward punishing children as adults
does not merely address the question of whether the age of criminal
responsibility should be lowered to fifteen or fourteen. In at least
twenty-eight states, the minimum age at which a child can be trans-
ferred to adult court is under fourteen, 41 and in some states there is
no lower limit at least for the most serious offenses. 42 Indeed, the
most controversial cases in recent years involve serious crimes commit-
ted by much younger children who, like Ignacio Bermudez's attacker,
seem at the time of their acts to "know what they are doing. '43 In-
creasingly the law allows such cases to be prosecuted, and such de-
fendants to be punished, in the criminal system. This punitive turn
toward pre-adolescent children is the latest sign that the law has repu-
diated the philosophy of redemption which generated, and long
animated, the juvenile justice system, and is replacing it with a belief
in the necessity of punishing "Bad Seeds."44 At least in part, this belief
40 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HoFSTRA L.
REV. 547, 550 (2000) ("[A] justice policy that treats adolescence as a distinct legal
category not only will promote youth welfare, but will also advance utilitarian objec-
tives of reducing the costs of youth crime."); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 799
(analyzing the case of Lionel Tate).
41 See, e.g., OFIcE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEI"T
OFJUsTICE, JUVENILE JUSTICE 17 (1999) (listing minimum age for judicial waiver in the
various states).
42 See, e.g., Beresford, supra note 14, at 800 n.135.
43 See, e.g., infra note 52 and accompanying text (recounting case of Nathaniel
Abraham). Consider, also, the case of Eric Morse, a five-year-old boy who in 1994 was
thrown off a building to his death by two other boys, aged ten and eleven after he
refused to steal candy for them. For a detailed account of the murder of Eric Morse,
see LLOYD NEWMAN ET AL., OUR AMERICA 87-155 (1997).
44 Contrary to the received scholarly view, our European allies have experienced
a similar development during the past quarter century. See, e.g., CONFRONTING YOUTH
IN EUROPE 25 (Jill Mehlbye & Lode Walgrave eds., 1998) (noting that in Europe
"[t]he age of criminal responsibility varies a lot. In England young delinquents from
the age of 10 can be prosecuted for their offences. In Scotland this is theoretically
possible from the age of 8. In Ireland this is even the case from the age of 7."); id. at
22-23 ("Shortly after the critical sixties and seventies, macro-evolutions in European
societies deeply influenced juvenile delinquency and the way to deal with it.... Public
opinion and governments were inclined towards an increased punitive approach to
delinquency. The pure rehabilitative model appeared more and more to be naive.
As a consequence, attention to the 'justice' element in dealing with juvenile offenders
became more important, including a stricter punishment-orientation."); Maud
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is premised on the retributive intuition that some children 
who com-
mit violent crimes are innately, or at least irredeemably, 
evil, and that
they deserve to suffer as much punishment as do 
adults who inflict
similar harms on society.
45 But the continuing controversy over the
issue indicates that, whatever the law may now allow, 
as a society we
are not yet fully convinced of the Bad Seed theory. 
When it comes to
punishing children for crime, age does still make 
a difference.
If the behavior of Brandon T. would otherwise 
qualify him as
criminally responsible, should the single fact 
of his age change that
legal status? If so, why? If not, why do we still 
flinch at the thought of
a six-year-old being sent to prison for a brutal, 
and admittedly inten-
tional, act? Beyond the specific issue of juvenile liability, cases 
such as
that of Brandon T. offer the chance to think more 
broadly about the
elements of criminal responsibility and the arguments 
that justify and
sustain criminal punishment.
Two intuitions fuel widespread scholarly opposition 
to punishing
children for crime. Not coincidentally, they are 
the same two beliefs
that gave rise to the juvenile justice system more than a century 
ago.
The first goes to the elements of responsibility, 
claiming that children
lack the threshold understanding and cognitive 
capacity to be "guilty"
for a harmful act.4 6 The second focuses not on mental 
capacity per se,
but on children's inherent potential 
for growth and change.
47
Whatever a child has done, (s)he is still a child, a person 
who will
someday grow up to be an adult. To inflict a long 
term of punishment
on a child is, ultimately, to visit suffering on 
a different being-the
adult whom the child will become-from the 
person who committed
the act. That, the argument goes, is unjust.
Frouke de Boer-Buquicchio, Deputy Sec. 
Gen., Council of Eur., Kilbrandon Lecture:
Justice for Europe's Children' (Dec. 1, 2003), available 
at http://www.gccs.gla.ac.-k/
pages/kilbrandon.htm. (noting, and regretting, that 
"the age of criminal responsibil-
ity varies considerably across Member States 
from as young as age 7 up to age 18").
45 For example, Florida state senator Ander 
Crenshaw has been quoted as saying:
"There are some juvenile] offenders who are lost .... 
It]hey have no sense of re-
morse, they are defiant by nature and they are 
never going to change." Krueger,
supra note 19. Additionally, when interviewed 
on Frontline, psychiatrist Martin
Blinder, who had interviewed the six-year-old 
who attacked Ignacio Bermudez,
opined: "The problem, to me, stems from 
my conviction that this sort of character
disorder, and certainly a character disorder 
of this early severity, is probably largely
genetic. There is something to be said for 
the phrase 'natural born killer.' It's my
view that most of what I found was predestined 
by his genetic endowment." Frontline:
Little Criminals, supra note 12.
46 See infra Part I.A.2.a-b.
47 See infra Part II.A.
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In this Article, I use the case of Brandon T. to 
examine both of
these intuitions about punishing children for crime. 
In Part I, I dis-
cuss the elements of criminal responsibility and examine 
the bases for
what I call the Culpability Thesis-the claim that 
children, by defini-
tion and as a class, do not possess the understanding, 
experience, and
cognitive capacities necessary to be held criminally 
liable. I conclude
that none of these arguments mandates the conclusion 
that children
must be categorically excluded from criminal 
responsibility.
Working from the conclusion in Part I that children 
can be crimi-
nally responsible, I move on in Part II to 
examine the Redemption
Thesis-the claim that, whatever their mental 
state and understand-
ing at the time of the harmful act, children's 
capacity for redemption
should exculpate them from criminal responsibility. 
I distinguish the
issue of corrigibility from that of liability and 
acknowledge that, al-
though not directly relevant to responsibility, 
corrigibility might well
matter to the separate question of how much 
convicted criminals
should be punished for crime. I conclude, though, 
that the Redemp-
tion Thesis-particularly to the extent it is used 
to draw a bright line
between adults and juveniles for purposes of the criminal 
law-is
more complex than it appears. If the capacity 
for redemption really is
a value that should inform criminal punishment, 
it is a value that cuts
against separating children and adults for purposes 
of the criminal
law.
In reaching these conclusions I rely on, and make 
repeated refer-
ence to, the excellent work of Stephen Morse 
on the subject of juve-
nile responsibility for crime.
48 Professor Morse's insights as to the
proper standard of criminal culpability generally-as 
to the applica-
tion of that standard to adolescents, and, as 
to the significance to
criminal guilt of differences between adolescents 
and adults-have ad-
ded greatly to the otherwise lopsided scholarly 
literature on this im-
portant subject. But, like virtually every other commentator 
on the
subject, Professor Morse limits his analysis to the issue of criminal 
lia-
bility for adolescents, and explicitly and categorically 
excludes young
children-even those who, like Brandon T., 
have committed violent
crimes that have inflicted serious harm-from 
responsibility on the
ground that "the issue of full or substantial responsibility 
is not seri-
ously in contention for young children.
49 The current structure of
the criminal law argues otherwise, and, I contend, 
only by allowing
ourselves to think deeply about cases such as 
those of Brandon T.-
48 See Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome 
and Criminal Responsibility: A Di-
agnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397 (2006); Morse, supra 
note 3M.
49 Morse, supra note 31, at 
5 2
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involving young children who do, in fact, commit heinous offenses-
can we understand, and do justice to, the reasons for the punitive turn
toward children in the criminal law.50
Ultimately, this Article seeks a rational account of the law of crim-
inal responsibility as it actually is, and particularly of the emerging
view that children, even young children, can and should be criminally
punished for seriously harmful acts. It is tempting to dismiss this
profound change in the law with the thought that legislators who
favor expansion of juvenile liability are simply playing politics, re-
sponding to public concern about juvenile crime in order to get re-
elected and with no thought to the underlying values involved. It is
true that legislative concern about juvenile crime has sometimes fol-
lowed controversial cases involving horrific acts by very young defend-
ants. 51 But what this reveals is not the superficial nature of politics;
instead, it demonstrates the weakness of the rationales that have tradi-
tionally supported a separate juvenile justice system. When a six-year-
old plans, strategizes, and ultimately inflicts a terrible harm on some-
one it immediately and graphically gives the lie to the idea that chil-
dren cannot possess the requisite mental capacity to inflict intentional
harm, When an eleven-year-old caps a record of twenty-three felonies
by murdering another child in cold blood at the direction of his gang,
it calls into serious question our assumption that all children can be
redeemed from a life of crime and, whatever they have done and with
whatever intent, should be treated rather than punished. 52 And when
50 Id.
51 Perhaps the single largest generator of public concern was a series of school
shootings that took place in the late 1990s. Most of the shootings involved adolescent
males, and some involved even younger children. See, e.g., Juvenile Violence Time Line,
WASH. POST ONLINE, 2000, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/long
term/juvmurders/timeline.htm (recounting (among others) the murders committed
at school by fourteen-year-old Barry Loukaitis in 1996; sixteen-year-old Luke Wood-
ham and fourteen-year-old Michael Carneal in 1997; thirteen-year-old Mitchell John-
son, eleven-year-old Andrew Golden, fourteen-year-old Andrew Wurst, eighteen-year-
old Jacob Davis, fifteen-year-old Kipland Kinkel, and fourteen-year-old Quinshawn
Booker in 1998; eighteen-year-old Eric Harris and seventeen-year-old Dylan Klebold at
Columbine High School in 1999).
52 The case is that of Robert 'Yummy" Sandifer, as described in PAUL H. ROBIN-
SON, CRIMINAL LAW CASE STUDIES 135 (2d ed. 2002) ("By age 11, [Yummy Sandifer]
has compiled rap sheet of 28 crimes, all but five of which are felonies."). Robinson's
account goes on to describe the murders of sixteen-year-old Kianta Britten and four-
teen-year-old Shavon Dean, by eleven-year-old Sandifer at the direction of his gang.
Id. Also consider the Michigan case of eleven-year-old Nathaniel Abraham, who was
tried and convicted as an adult for a 1997 murder which he committed by shooting
his victim while perched in a tree. Before the murder, Nathaniel "was already a sus-
pect in nearly two dozen crimes, including burglary, larceny, home invasion, arson,
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such events repeatedly contradict our assumptions about 
culpability, it
is hardly surprising if the public, and the lawmakers 
it elects, begin to
question the accuracy of those assumptions.
It is not only legislators' punitive response to horrific 
acts by chil-
dren that should hold our attention; it is the revelation, 
graphically
and unarguably revealed by this change in laws, that 
the two rationales
which have supported the juvenile justice system for more than a 
cen-
tury may well be dead wrong. That is the reality 
to which the law has
responded by expanding juvenile liability for crime.
But even conceding the above, the law's punitive 
response is not
the only possible one. For those many citizens who 
favor a robust the-
ory of criminal responsibility but also cringe at the 
idea of sending a
six-year-old to prison no matter what (s)he has done, the collapse 
of
the traditional rationales for excusing juveniles offers an invaluable
chance to test out the intuition that children should, 
nonetheless, be
excused from criminal responsibility. Can that intuition 
still be justi-
fied, and if so, on what basis?
If the argument in this Article is correct, a valid 
basis for a cate-
gorical "youth excuse" will not be found in the rubrics 
of difference,
redemptive potential, or lack of mental capacity. 
In Part III, I suggest
a new and different justification-one that is grounded not in behav-
ioral or brain differences but in the law's own treatment 
of, and conse-
quent obligation toward, all children.
I. BRANDON T. AND THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY
Suppose that when you first read the description 
of the attack on
Ignacio Bermudez you agreed that the perpetrator 
was guilty of a seri-
ous crime, that the charge of attempted murder 
seemed appropriate
in the case. How did you then react when you read 
that Brandon was
six years old at the time of the attack? Was your 
reaction the same as
that of Harold Jewett, the California prosecutor who 
brought the at-
tempted murder charge against Brandon? "It doesn't 
matter whether
you're 6 or you're 106," said Jewett in an interview.
53 
"If you do some-
thing that hurts someone else, with knowledge of 
the wrongfulness of
it, you're responsible for it, period.
'5 4 Or did the single fact of Bran-
don's age make you hesitate? If the latter, why? 
Did Brandon's age
give you pause because you think it should matter 
to his criminal lia-
bility; or because you think that regardless of liability 
he should not be
threatening classmates, beating two teenagers 
with metal pipes, and snatching a wo-
man's purse at gunpoint." Beresford, supra 
note 14, at 785 n.9.
53 Frontline: Little Criminals, supra note 12.
54 Id.
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criminally punished; or for some other, independent reason? This
Part addresses the first possibility, which I call the Liability Thesis.
A. The Liability Thesis: Mens Rea in Children
One reason offered in favor of exempting children from criminal
liability is that they lack the capacity to be mentally culpable.5 5 Young
children in particular, according to this argument, are not capable of
forming the requisite intent, or mens rea, to be responsible even for
their otherwise criminal acts. This view has a long history. Even
before the creation of separate juvenile courts in the late-nineteenth
century, children younger than seven at the time of their acts were
treated as not responsible for crime, largely on the theory that young
children lack the capacity to form mens rea, or culpable intent.56 The
assumption that juveniles lack the requisite mens rea for criminal re-
sponsibility was also a core reason for removing them from the crimi-
nal justice system entirely and creating a separate, non-punitive
adjudication structure for dealing with juvenile crime. 57 But what
does it mean to say that a person lacks the capacity to form mens rea?
To answer that we need to work from a theory of what mens rea is and
what capacities it requires.
55 See Morse, supra note 31, at 52.
56 For example, consider the seventeenth-century writings of Sir Matthew Hale
on the use of the insanity defense in England.
(Hale] assigned or withheld legal accountability for criminal activity accord-
ing to whether or not the child was doli capax-possessed of the intelligence
and comprehension to form the blameworthy intent necessary for the com-
mission of a crime. Under the age-based system of classification [devised by
Hale], a child under seven was termed infantia, by definition doli incapax
and barred from prosecution for a criminal offense.
Bazelon, supra note 13, at 168-70. Andrew Walkover traces this idea back to the com-
mon law and notes that "[a]t common law the infancy defense was grounded in an
unwillingness to punish individuals incapable of forming criminal intent and thus
incapable of assuming responsibility for their acts." Andrew Walkover, The Infancy
Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REv. 503, 512 (1984). See generally
Bazelon, supra note 13, at 190 (arguing that the same standard should apply today to
juvenile offenders who were under age seven at the time of their otherwise criminal
behavior).
57 See, e.g., Stephen Bates Billick, Developmental Competency, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSyCHtATRY & L 301, 302 (1986) ("The founding premise of the juvenile justice sys-
tem was that juveniles were incompetent to commit crimes with the same intent as
adults because of maturational immaturity .... ").
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1. The Elements of Criminal Responsibility
Criminal law doctrine affords two routes to understanding the el-
ements of responsibility. The first focuses on what the state must
prove to show mental culpability in a criminal trial; the second as-
sumes that the state can prove the elements of a crime, 58 and outlines
conditions under which the defendant might nonetheless argue in
favor of exculpation.59
The first route is fairly straightforward. To make out a prima fa-
cie case the state must show that the defendant did the act which
caused the originally prohibited harm, and that at the time of the act,
the defendant possessed the requisite mental state for commission of
the crime. The Model Penal Code sets out four standards of mental
culpability-conscious purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negli-
gence. 60 Thus, if the state can show beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant had the conscious purpose at the time of doing the acts
he's charged with doing and of causing the harm he caused, then the
state has proven mens rea.6 1 Where defendant lacks such intent (ei-
ther because he has no capacity to form intent, or for some other
reason), and such intent is a required element of the crime with
which (s)he is charged, (s)he has a defense "on the elements," which
is another way of saying that the state's case will fail for lack of mens
rea.
6 2
But even when the state has demonstrated that the defendant
committed the act with criminal "intent," the defendant may nonethe-
less avoid liability if he or she can successfully advance an affirmative
excuse or justification. 63 The premise of a justification defense is that
although the defendant's behavior normally would violate the law, the
58 See, e.g., Robert E. Shepard, Jr., Juvenile Justice: Rebirth of the Infancy Defense,
CRIM. JUST., Summer 1997, at 45, 45 ("[Most states have) greatly liberalized the ability
of the state to try juveniles as adults.").
59 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.01 (1962).
60 Id. § 2.02. A fifth standard, of strict liability, eliminates the mens rea require-
ment for some (minor) crimes. See id. § 2.05.
61 Id. Under Model Penal Code section 2.02(5), higher levels of mens rea suffice
to prove lower levels. Thus,
[wjhen the law provides that negligence suffices to establish an element of
an offense, such element also is established if a person acts purposely, know-
ingly or recklessly. When recklessness suffices to establish an element, such
element also is established if a person acts purposely or knowingly. When
acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, such element also is estab-
lished if a person acts purposely.
Id.
62 See id. § 2.02 (j).
63 See id. §§ 3.01-.04, 4.01.
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defendant did the right thing in the particular situation 
facing him or
her. The paradigmatic case for justification is self-defense-the 
de-
fendant acknowledges that he intentionally killed 
the victim under cir-
cumstances in which defendant reasonably believed 
that the victim
presented an immediate threat of death or serious 
bodily injury.64 In
that situation (and assuming defendant's claim can be proven), 
we say




The other form of affirmative defense is excuse. 
When defen-
dant lays claim to an excuse she acknowledges 
that (1) the state can
prove mens rea (as well as causation and actus reus), 
and that (2)
what she did was wrong-her behavior cannot 
be justified under the
law.66 Nevertheless, defendant asks to be 
exonerated from criminal
responsibility on the grounds of some personal 
defect or lack of ca-
pacity that would render it unjust to convict her of a crime. The 
para-
digm here is the excuse of insanity, on the 
Model Penal Code's
definition of which defendant may escape criminal 
liability if, (1) as a
result of a mental disease or defect, (2) Defendant lacks 
"substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] 
of his con-
duct or to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of law."67 Notice
that this suggests the necessity of certain threshold 
capacities-to ap-
preciate the wrongfulness of one's act, and to 
have the ability to con-
trol one's conduct to the extent of complying 
with the law-before
criminal liability may be imposed. In addition, 
the affirmative excuse
of duress illuminates the law's assumption 
that persons guilty of a
crime have acted voluntarily and not under 
coercion by another
person. 68
64 See, e.g., id. § 3.04(2) (b) ("The use of deadly force 
is not justifiable ... unless
the actor believes that such force is necessary 
to protect himself against death, serious
bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled 
by force or threat ... ").
65 See also id. § 3.02 (explaining that the harm or evil 
sought to be avoided by
such conduct is greater than that sought to 
be prevented by the law defining the
offense charged).
66 See, e.g., id. §§ 2.04, 2.08, 4.00 (discussing the excuses 
of ignorance, mistake,
intoxication, and mental disease).
67 Id. § 4.01.
68 See, e.g., id. § 2.09 ("It is an affirmative defense that 
the actor engaged in the
conduct charged to constitute an offense because 
he was coerced to do so by the use
of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against 
his person or the person of another,
which a person of reasonable firmness in his 
situation would have been unable to
resist.").
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2. Do Children as a Class Lack the Capacities Required for
Criminal Liability?
a. Brandon T, and Threshold Culpability
If the above discussion is correct, the law assumes the presence of
three threshold capacities when a person is charged with a crime.
These are (1) instrumental rationality, which in turn requires the ca-
pacity to form the conscious purpose to do a thing, to correlate that
intent with actions capable of achieving it, and to follow through by
performing those actions which cause the criminal harm;69 (2) the
capacity to understand the difference between acting rightfully and
acting wrongfully; and (3) the capacity to refrain from acting wrong-
fully which essentially assumes that defendant did not act under over-
powering compulsion (from inside or outside) that left him with no
choice but to do wrong.
Is it true that, as a class and by definition, children lack the
threshold level of these capacities required for criminal liability? Con-
sider, again, the case of Brandon T. Evidence in that case indicated
that Brandon (1) held a grudge against the parents of Ignacio
Bermudez; (2) determined to kill Ignacio in order to revenge himself
on the baby's parents for "harassing him;" (3) recruited accomplices;
(4) waited until Ignacio's parents were out of the house; and (5) went
to the baby's room where he brutally beat Ignacio, inflicting enor-
mous and irreparable damage. 70 After the attack, Brandon T. (1)
stole a very popular "Big Wheel" tricycle from the Bermudez house;
(2) warned a potential witness, a little girl, 'You better not tell any-
body what I did;" (3) initially lied to police by saying that he didn't do
it; and (4) eventually confessed and reenacted the entire event on
videotape. 71
It seems clear from the facts that at the time he attacked Ignacio
Bermudez, Brandon T. (1) intended to perform the acts that harmed
Ignacio (he did not accidentally knock the baby out of its bassinet; he
intentionally threw the baby on the floor); (2) did those intentional
actions with the conscious purpose of harming the baby (when he
took the baby out of the bassinet and dropped him, he did not think
that Ignacio would fly out of the room; he knew the baby would fall to
the floor and that the fall would harm him); (3) knew that if he were
caught by authorities he would get into trouble; and (4) took precau-
69 See Morse, supra note 31, at 25 (reasoning that rationality is the ability to per-
ceive accurately and reason instrumentally); infra text accompanying notes 87-90.
70 Beck, supra note 1.
71 Id.
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tions to prevent this from happening. On its face, Brandon's act was
intentional and premeditated-not compelled or coerced-and the
acts were done with the knowledge that if he were caught he would
probably be punished.
b. Competence, Character, and Autonomy
From the perspective of criminal liability, is anything missing
from this picture? Consider the following argument: Both the ele-
ments (actus reus and mens rea) and the affirmative defenses (which
can exculpate despite the undisputed existence of the elements) as-
sume, and proceed from, a background standard that not only dic-
tates the doctrinal content of the existing grounds for exculpation but
also offers an independent basis for gauging the responsibility (or
non-responsibility) of particular defendants or group of defendants.
In the context of juvenile responsibility for crime, Professor Stephen
Morse has applied the standard of "normative competence. '72 Profes-
sor Morse describes normative competence as "the most ... important
prerequisite to being morally responsible"73 and defines it as "the gen-
eral capacity to understand and be guided by the reasons that support
a moral prohibition we accept."74 An agent is normatively incompe-
tent (and thus not morally responsible) when he or she "either ... is
unable rationally to comprehend the facts that bear on the morality of
his action or is unable rationally to comprehend the applicable moral
or legal code.'7 5 Rationality, in turn,
is the ability to perceive accurately, to get the facts right, and to
reason instrumentally, including weighing the facts appropriately
and according to a minimally coherent preference-ordering. Put
yet another way, it is the ability to act for good reasons and it is
always a good reason not to act (or to act) if doing so (or not doing
so) will be wrong.76
72 Morse, supra note 31, at 24.
73 Id. at 24-25.
74 Id. at 25.
75 Id.
76 Id. Notice that, on Morse's view, it is not necessary that the defendant acted
for good, generalizable reasons at the time of the crime. Most offenders presumably
do not or they would not have offended. The general normative capacity to be able
to grasp and be guided by reason is sufficient. Professor Morse includes within his
conception of normative competence the requirement of empathy-in his view a de-
fendant who lacks "the ability to empathize and to feel guilt or some other reflexive
reactive emotion" lacks normative competence and should not be criminally responsi-
ble. Id. at 26. As Morse acknowledges, this requirement is not now a feature of the
actual criminal law-the lack of a conscience is not a valid basis for being excused
from criminal liability.
2006]
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Professor Morse seems to propose normative competence as a back-
ground standard against which the criminal liability of all defendants,
including adolescent defendants, can validly be measured. 77
But Morse makes it clear that he considers pre-adolescent chil-
dren to be normatively incompetent because of their age. He argues
that since young children "lack many of the necessary attributes of
rationality" and "infrequently commit serious crimes .... the issue of
full or substantial responsibility is not seriously in contention for
young children."78 Morse simply concludes, without analysis, that
young children are by definition normatively incompetent and that
they ought therefore to be excluded from criminal responsibility as a
class. 79
Why is Brandon T. normatively incompetent under the standard
laid down by Morse? Thinking about this question exposes a perplex-
ing problem with the standard of normative competence itself. Upon
close inspection, the standard quickly becomes maddeningly elusive,
offering no clear solution to the problem of responsibility. Consider
its key terms. To be "normatively competent" (and thus criminally
responsible) a defendant must possess "the general capacity to under-
stand and be guided by the reasons that support a moral prohibition
we accept."80 The phrase "general capacity" apparently refers to de-
fendant's abilities as demonstrated in his or her everyday behavior,
not necessarily to his or her behavior at the time of the crime. The
question for Morse is does this defendant, in general, possess the "ca-
pacity to understand and to be guided by [good] reasons"?8' If not,
then defendant is not responsible. If so, defendant is responsible, al-
though his behavior at the time of the crime may well have demon-
strated that he also has the capacity to understand and be guided by
bad reasons.8 2
But how ought one to apply this standard? To a large degree-as
Morse acknowledges-the judgments of rationality and normative
competence in any particular case will rest on moral and political intu-
itions that must remain contingent and debatable.8 - "Nonetheless,"




81 Id. at 24-25.
82 Id. at 25-26.
83 Id. at 25 ("What is the content of rationality that responsibility requires? As
part of the normative, socially constructed practice of blaming, there cannot be a self-
defining answer. A normative, moral and political judgment concerning the content
and degree of rationality is necessary.").
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he argues, "some guid[ance] is possible,"' 4 and it would seem that
some definition of the basic terms in the standard is necessary in or-
der for it to have any content at all.
Consider that in assessing culpability the law generally looks to
what a defendant was thinking, to his or her mental state at the time
of the act, not to the defendant's capacities outside of that time frame.
If the defendant was delusional and killed someone because of a delu-
sion, then (s)he should presumably be excused. If not, not. In many
or most such cases, the defendant will turn out to have pre-existing
mental and/or emotional difficulties, and to the extent these have
been documented and can be presented at trial, such facts may add
credence to the defendant's claim that (s)he was delusional at the
time of the act. But, for example, if defendant has long been para-
noid schizophrenic but kills someone for a wrongful, but non-delu-
sional, reason, this is no excuse although defendant's mental illness
may, in general, affect his or her ability to understand and obey the
law.8 5 Conversely, if defendant in general has the capacity to under-
stand and obey the law but became delusional in this case, the defen-
dant should, presumably, be excused and (evidentiary issues aside)
the relevance of his or her general capacities is, at best, unclear.
Second, what does it mean to say that a defendant has, or does
not have, the "capacity to understand and to be guided by [good]
reasons"?86 On Morse's view, rationality is the key. Rational compre-
hension involves "the ability to perceive accurately, to get the facts
right, and to reason instrumentally, including weighing the facts ap-
propriately and according to a minimally coherent preference-order-
ing."87 Fine. But again, what does this mean? What does it mean to
say that a defendant possesses the general ability to perceive accurately
(to perceive what accurately?); to get the facts right (which facts?); and
to reason instrumentally, including weighing the facts appropriately?
(Appropriately? Again, which facts, and according to what conception
of appropriateness?) On what basis do we decide that a defendant has
84 Id.
85 See, e.g., Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006). Eric Clark was a paranoid
schizophrenic who was found guilty of first degree murder. After announcing to
classmates that he wanted to kill a police officer, Clark drove a pickup truck at dawn
to a neighborhood near his home, then blared the radio while circling the block.
When Officer Jeffrey Moritz responded to calls by the residents, Clark shot him dead.
Announcing his verdict of guilty to murder, the judge at Clark's bench trial took note
of the fact that, although he had allowed Clark to present evidence directly connect-
ing his admitted paranoid schizophrenia to the killing of the police officer, no such
evidence had been presented. Id. at 2716-18.
86 Morse, supra note 31, at 24-25.
87 Id. at 25.
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these general abilities, when (s)he has been accused of an 
act that
seems to demonstrate their absence? Answers 
to such questions are
key to understanding how the standard would work 
out in particular
cases.
Now consider the standard of normative competence 
as applied
to the case of Brandon T. In Morse's view, the 
law, in deciding
whether or not Brandon T. is criminally responsible, 
looks to his gen-
eral capacity for rationality."
8 Does Brandon T., in general, possess
"the ability to perceive accurately, to get the facts 
right, and to reason
instrumentally, including weighing the facts appropriately 
and accord-
ing to a minimally coherent preference-ordering?"
89 According to
Morse, a defendant may possess these capacities-and 
thus be
deemed responsible for purposes of the criminal 
law-although (s)he
failed to demonstrate them at the time of his or 
her alleged criminal
act.90 But consider, in this respect, the capacities 
Brandon T. did
demonstrate in his attack on Ignacio. Motivated by 
his desire to hurt
Mr. and Mrs. Bermudez,9' Brandon T. accurately perceived 
that harm-
ing Ignacio would injure his parents; devised a plan under which 
he
could gain access to the baby; waited for the right 
moment (when
Ignacio's parents were not present) to carry out the plan; 
and after
successfully putting the plan into action, took steps 
to avoid what he
knew would be the unpleasant consequences of getting 
caught.92 In
short, Brandon T. clearly demonstrated instrumental 
rationality,
knowledge of wrongfulness, a quite sophisticated 
knowledge of how to
cause pain to one's enemies, and the executive capacity 
to unite his
desire for revenge on Ignacio's parents with a plan 
that successfully
put that desire into effect. Given what seems to be 
a powerful case in
favor of holding Brandon responsible, the burden shifts 
here-why,
despite these facts, should he not be criminally 
responsible?
Despite Brandon T.'s demonstrated abilities to 
perceive accu-
rately, reason instrumentally, and assess the facts 
and situation appro-
priately (given the end he had in view), perhaps one might argue 
that
88 See id. at 24-25.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 25-26.
91 The desire alone, Morse concedes, does not prove Brandon's 
irrationality. See,
e.g., id. at 27 ("[E]ven if desires can be construed as irrational, 
irrational desires do
not deprive the agent of normative competence unless 
they somehow disable the ra-
tional capacities just addressed or they produce an internal hard 
choice situation dis-
tinguishable from the choices experienced by 
people with equally strong, rational
desires."). Neither of these exceptions would seem to apply 
to cases such as that of
Brandon T.
92 See Beck, supra note 1.
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Brandon T. nonetheless lacked "the ability to act for good reason"
that is requisite to a finding of normative competence.9" One could
attempt this conclusion in two ways. First, one might import a compo-
nent of virtue into one's conception of rationality by arguing, for ex-
ample, that key terms in the definition of normative competence-
such as "accurately" and "appropriately"-refer not merely to defen-
dant's ability to recognize his preferences and to take action that max-
imizes the likelihood those preferences will be realized, but go also to
the merits of those preferences-perceiving "accurately" means per-
ceiving that hurting a baby is a monstrous thing to do, and weighing
the facts "appropriately" means (for example) putting less weight on
one's grudge against the Bermudez family than on the probable harm
one will cause by beating their child. In short, the standard might
require that defendant possess a recognizable moral code as well as
the threshold mental capacity to identify and effectively to act upon
his preferences. The capacity "to understand and be guided by good...
reason[s]" necessarily implies that defendant has accepted those rea-
sons and has the mental wherewithal to apply them, in general, to his
decisions .9 4
But this version of the standard would work very troubling
changes on the criminal law. Consider the virtue-based standard as
applied to three defendants, DI-D3. By hypothesis D1 has the gen-
eral capacity to understand and be guided by the reasons that support
moral/legal prohibitions, which means that (s)he has accepted the
relevance of such reasons and can, in general, apply them in making
decisions. D2 and D3 lack the general capacity to understand and be
guided by good reason, but the lack takes two different forms: (a) D2
is legally insane, while (b) D3 has consciously rejected good in favor of
evil-for example D3 lacks the capacity for empathy and remorse, and
without those threshold capacities D3 is unable to understand or be
guided by good reason.9 5
Now consider the relative criminal liability of Ds 1-3 under the
virtue-based version of normative competence. D1, the defendant
93 Morse, supra note 31, at 25.
94 Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
95 In theory we might imagine two subspecies of D3, D3(a) and D3(b). One can
coherently imagine D3(a), who once possessed the capacity for empathy and remorse,
but made the choice to suppress them in order to acquire wealth, position, or power.
For the purposes of moral evaluation such a defendant might merit different treat-
ment than D3(b), who lacks empathic ability but may or may not have adopted affirm-
atively evil values. However, in the case of a D whose lack of empathy, however
acquired, leads him or her to commit violent offenses against innocent others, Ds 3(a)
and 3(b) may be functionally identical for the purposes of the criminal law.
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who possesses and (in general) displays the capacity to be guided 
by
good reasons is criminally responsible although the 
crime (s)he com-
mitted presumably failed to demonstrate such capacity. 
If D2 is in-
sane, (s)he merits an excuse under the virtue-based standard, 
and this
result is entirely uncontroversial. In that situation 
the standard adds
nothing to existing doctrine or to the particular 
debate over juvenile
responsibility under the law.
96 But Morse would go much farther,
mandating that D3 must also be excused.
97 And this is what makes the
virtue based standard so troubling. D1, the defendant 
who in general
has the capacity to act on good reasons because 
(in part) (s)he ac-
cepts the moral standards they represent, is 
criminally responsible.
D3, who does not accept the good reasons supporting 
the moral
prohibitions of the law because his lack of empathic 
ability has de-
prived him of a conscience (and he therefore lacks an 
internal coun-
terbalance to his violent and evil desires) and therefore 
lacks the
"capacity" to understand and be guided by them, is not criminally re-
sponsible under the virtue-based conception.
The standard of normative competence represents 
Professor
Morse's attempt to lay out a proper basis for evaluating 
the blamewor-
thiness of all defendantsY
8 He must be saying, therefore, that D3 is
less blameworthy for his or her criminal actions 
than is D1. But this
seems wrong. Suppose that Ds 1 and 3 are 
charged with intentional
murder. D1 understands and accepts that killing 
is wrong, but al-
lowed her intense hatred of a particular victim, 
V1, to overcome that
moral prohibition. D3 raped V3 because he 
felt like it, and then
killed her in order to prevent her from testifying 
against him for the
rape. On what grounds could we plausibly 
conclude that D3 is less
blameworthy for his actions than DI?
99
96 Presumably everyone agrees that where 
a juvenile defendant is legally insane
that defendant, like any other defendant, merits 
an excuse. The debate about juve-
nile liability concerns cases in which the defendant 
is concededly not insane but is
nevertheless developmentally different from 
adults in various ways deemed relevant.
On the ultimate relevance of such differences 
to the law, see infra text accompanying
notes 127-30.
97 Morse, supra note 31, at 26 ("After much thought, 
I have come to the conclu-
sion that normative competence should require 
the ability to empathize and to feel
guilt or some other reflexive reactive emotion.").
98 See, e.g., supra notes 72-74 and accompanying 
text.
99 Indeed, an initial intuition might be that 
D1 is clearly less culpable than the
others, since almost by definition he would seem 
to lack the ability to do the kind of
deliberate and premeditated murder that D3 
might commit. Dl's capacity to commit
such a murder has in fact been defined away 
by the virtue standard; the most serious
form of homicide of which DI would appear capable 
would be one in which his moral
restraint is overcome by a strong emotion such 
as rage or fear-and thus becomes the
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This seems to be where Morse's normative requirement of em-
pathic ability comes in. A second, and potentially related, way of find-
ing Brandon T. to be normatively incompetent would be to add a
requirement of empathic ability to the responsibility standard. Morse
might argue, for example, that D3 should be excused from criminal
responsibility on grounds of fairness because the lack of capacity to
feel empathy and remorse makes D3 "not amenable to reason."100
This does seem to be a key link, in Morse's mind, between responsibil-
ity in general and responsibility in children. 01
Since Professor Morse acknowledges that psychopathy is not in
fact a basis for excuse under the criminal law as it exists,10 2 Morse's
empathy argument expressly moves the discussion from the descrip-
tive to the prescriptive. And the prescription seems profoundly
wrong. The result of making empathetic capacity a necessary compo-
nent of normative competence would be that those offenders, like D3,
who lack remorse and fellow feeling would be excused from criminal
liability and punishment on those grounds. And this would be a per-
nicious result, for at least three reasons.
First, while it seems to be the case that many violent criminals are
psychopaths, it is not the case that all psychopaths are criminals. In-
deed, recent evidence indicates that psychopaths exist in all walks of
life, many quite legal.10 If such research is true, it may well be the
possible basis for a partial excuse due to provocation or extreme emotional
disturbance.
100 Morse, supra note 31, at 26 ("Perhaps people who lack the capacity for empa-
thy and guilt-the so-called 'psychopaths'-are particularly immoral and deserve spe-
cial condemnation rather than excuse, but this does not seem fair. To the best of our
knowledge, some harmdoers simply lack these capacities and they are not amenable
to reason. They may be dangerous people, but they are not part of our moral com-
munity."); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (1962) ("A person is not responsible
for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mutual disease or
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness]
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.").
101 Professor Morse identifies the capacity for empathy as a "critical distinguishing
variable" and argues that if adolescents "lack the general capacity for empathy that is a
component of full moral agency... then adolescents as a class may be less responsible
moral agents in general and might deserve mitigation, if not full exoneration."
Morse, supra note 31, at 60. Morse goes on to acknowledge, however, that the law
does not excuse (adult) psychopaths on grounds of their lack of empathy. Id. at 61.
"On my theory of responsibility," he adds, "such people should be excused and I wish
to proceed as if the law followed." Id.
102 Id. at 60-61.
103 See, e.g., BelindaJane Board & Katarina Fritzon, Disordered Personalities at Work,
11 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 17, 18-25 (2005) (comparing personality traits of successful
business managers and patients at Broadmoor Hospital, one of Britain's highest se-
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case that most psychopaths-that is, most people 
who lack the capac-
ity to feel empathy and remorse-demonstrate both 
the inclination
and the capacity to stay on the right side of the 
law. Since, by defini-
tion, they do not obey the law because they respect 
other people or
because breaking the law would make them feel 
guilty, presumably
they obey it for other reasons. Among those reasons 
are the costs as-
sociated with being criminally prosecuted and 
punished for commit-
ting a crime. Excusing psychopaths from criminal 
punishment would
dramatically reduce the strength of this disincentive, 
and therefore
dramatically reduce the psychopath's interest 
in remaining law-
abiding.
Professor Morse's argument focuses more on 
the deontological
bases for punishment-the question of whether 
defendant deserves
punishment or not-than on utilitarian ones. 
But the point is impor-
tant because it suggests that the common 
view of psychopathy and its
relationship to crime is quite impoverished. We 
often discuss psycho-
paths as though their deficits-in the capacities 
for empathy and re-
morse-constitute a sufficient explanation of 
their criminal misdeeds.
But this is in fact a highly debatable assumption. 
Consider a psycho-
pathic killer like Ted Bundy, who was executed 
in Florida in 1989 af-
ter confessing to the murders of more than thirty 
women.
10 4 In the
public mind, Bundy has come to symbolize the 
psychopath, a person
who is relentlessly self-focused, manipulative, and 
incapable of empa-
thy or remorse. But these deficits by themselves 
are not a sufficient
explanation of Bundy's murderous career. Again, 
most psychopaths
(if pyschopathy is defined this way) do not commit 
violent crimes,1 0 5
and most certainly do not travel coast to coast 
for the purpose of mur-
dering women. What explains the difference between 
Bundy and the
law-abiding psychopath is not the absence of empathy 
and remorse,
curity hospitals). Business managers scored higher than 
patients on measures of his-
trionic, narcissistic and compulsive personality; 
such traits are thought to reflect
psychopathic characteristics such as superficial 
charm, lack of empathy, and perfec-
tionism. Id. at 25. Unlike the Broadmoor patients, 
the business managers scored
lower on antisocial, borderline, and paranoid 
personality traits, indicating lower levels
of aggression, impulsivity, and mistrust. Id. 
The authors suggest that the business
managers may be examples of "'[s]uccessful psychopaths 
... people with psycho-
pathic [personality disorder] patterns, but without the 
characteristic history of arrest
and incarceration." Id. at 18-19 (quoting Donald R. 
Lynam et al., Self-Reported Psy-
chopathy: A Validation Study, 73J. PERSONALfrly ASSESSMENT 
110, 111 (1999)).
104 John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right 
to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An Assess-
ment of the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years After 
Faretta, 6 SE'ON HALL
CoN sT. L.J. 483, 486 n.5 (1996).
105 See Board & Fritzon, supra note 103, at 
18-19 (noting growing empirical re-
search into "successful" psychopaths who avoid 
arrest and incarceration).
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but that absence combined with the presence of the desires to hurt, kill, and
do other kinds of serious harm to people. What prompted Bundy to kill was
not the mere absence of empathy for his victims or anticipatory re-
morse for killing them; but the absence of those things combined with
the presence of the desire to kill women. Most people, whether psychopaths
or not, do not have this desire. Bundy deserved criminal punishment
not because he was a psychopath but because he possessed the affirm-
ative intent to, and did, commit murder, while recognizing that the
acts he did were blameworthy and would be condemned by society.
It may of course be true that lack of empathic ability makes it
more difficult for a psychopath to obey the law, in the sense that one
barrier to law-breaking-what we call "conscience"-is missing from
the psychopath's mental toolkit. But, as Morse acknowledges, the fact
that some people find it more difficult to obey the law than others is
not, and should not be, valid grounds for an excuse from criminal
responsibility106 The criminal law is properly indifferent to such
claims. A defendant will not be heard to argue that he should be
excused for an otherwise criminal action because he has a very impul-
sive temperament; because he is quick to anger and has a strong ten-
dency toward violent expression of his rage; or, even because he
suffered an abused and loveless childhood and never learned to treat
others with care and respect. Yet all of these things can make it more
difficult-in many cases much more difficult-for defendants to resist
their desire to harm. Why is lack of a conscience different in kind
from these other character and personality defects, such that the par-
ticular defect of lack of empathy should be singled out as the basis for
excuse and these other lacks may not? Considering the very great
harm of which psychopathic criminals are capable and that they do, in
fact, inflict on society, more thought must be given to these questions
before legally sane psychopaths are excused from criminal
responsibility.
Nor is such an excuse necessarily implied by the normative com-
petence standard itself. One could make a quite compelling argu-
ment that Ted Bundy easily met the standard-that he possessed, and
consistently demonstrated, the "ability to perceive accurately, to get
the facts right, and to reason instrumentally, including weighing the
106 Morse, supra note 31, at 28 ("Those who are fortunate enough to be especially
brave and those who are of average braveness will be able to meet [the standard of
normative competence] quite readily. Those who are of less than average disposi-
tional firmness will have more trouble resisting when they should. Still, if we judge
that the person had the general capacity to comply with the reasonable firmness stan-
dard, even if it is harder for her than most, then she will be held responsible if she
yields when a person of reasonable firmness would have resisted.").
2006]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
facts appropriately and according to a minimally coherent preference
ordering." 07
Thus, the standard of normative competence offers no clear and
valid basis on which to excuse Brandon T. from criminal responsibil-
ity. And Morse's proposal to make responsibility dependant on the
capacity for empathy would produce the untenable and unwarranted
result that the most dangerous, violent, and evil-minded criminals
among us would be excused from responsibility for their criminal
actions.
But what if children as a group lack empathic capacity, or have
less of it than adults? Shouldn't such a (temporary) disability absolve,
or at least reduce, their liability for crime, on the grounds that this
lack makes it more. difficult for them to obey the law? As a normative
matter this is an interesting question-but it requires an additional
argument explaining why children should be excused on those
grounds although adults possessing the same defect are not. Beyond
that, and as a descriptive matter, it strikes me as quite implausible to
say that children, even children as young as six, lack a threshold level
of empathy as a group. The vast majority of children do not attempt
to murder other people, and recent evidence indicates that those who
do are both quite rare and are much more likely than other children
to become psychopaths and/or lifelong criminal offenders.108 To the
extent that refraining from doing violent harm to others requires
some threshold level of empathy, the burden of proof should be
placed on those who would claim that children as a group lack this
quality.
B. The Relevance of Facts and Contact
But perhaps the above moves too quickly. Even on a minimalist
account such as the one offered here, it must be true that criminal
responsibility requires some understanding of at least certain facts
and context. After all, the mens rea of conscious purpose requires
that the defendant understand and intend the probable consequences
of his actions.'( 9 Homicide, for example, is often defined by state stat-
ute as the "unlawful killing of a human being."'" 0 In a homicide case,
107 Id. at 25.
108 See infra notes 159-61.
109 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (a) (1962) ("A person acts purposely with respect
to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his
conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that
nature or to cause such a result ... ").
110 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1999).
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a defendant cannot be guilty of murder or attempted murder unless
he or she understood, at the time of the killing, what it means for a
person to die. If a defendant really believes that when you kill some-
one they come back to life the next day, it would be wrong to hold
him guilty of murder or attempted murder since he doesn't compre-
hend an essential fact about the harm resulting from his purpose and
his actions. At a minimum, understanding the "essential facts" about
killing someone requires the knowledge that when someone dies they
are gone for good. The younger children are, the less likely they are
to understand such facts, and-the argument might go-this lack of
understanding should render young children non-culpable for homi-
cide or attempted homicide.
In the case of Brandon T., the evidence conflicted on the ques-
tion of whether he understood what it means to kill or to die. On the
one hand, Brandon's own father had been murdered when the child
was four. Brandon knew that his father had died violently and the
child was given to fantasizing about the event."' On the other hand,
Brandon's defense attorney and at least one court appointed expert
concluded that the boy did not understand what it meant to kill a
person, and on the basis of those opinions the court ultimately
amended the criminal charge from attempted murder to assault with
intent to commit bodily harm.1 12 Thus, the case offers no convincing
11I Frontline: Little Criminals, supra note 12 (interviewing Brandon T.'s defense at-
torney, John Burris).
112 Id.; see also Curtius, supra note 6 (describing how " [tlhe case faded from public
view only after a Juvenile Court referee ruled that the assailant could not understand
his offense"). It is noteworthy, however, that psychiatrist Martin Blinder, one of three
mental health professionals who interviewed Brandon T. in order to evaluate his com-
petency, found the boy competent to stand trial. In an interview with Frontline, Dr.
Blinder described the process by which he reached that decision:
I must say, in truth, I was surprised after I completed my assessment to
find the 6-year-old competent. My bias going in was, "This is ridiculous.
How can a 6-year-old be competent to stand trial? How could he have even
understood what he was doing, no less what a trial is all about?" But the kids
watch television and they watch the cop shows and they watch the lawyer
shows and they have-they may not watch them like they watch "Sesame
Street," but kids are tremendously aware these days. So this kid certainly was
aware that he was in deep trouble and that there were certain procedures
that were likely to befall him.
He understood that society considered what he had done wrong, which
is why he was being locked up at juvenile hall. He knew the judge's task. He
knew his lawyer was there to help him. He knew the prosecutor was going to
gather the evidence against him. And he understood that if things didn't go
his way, he might not go home to see his mommy for a long, long time. So
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argument that six-year-olds as a class must be exempted from liability
for homicide. The question of exemption hinges on the answer to the
prior question of what exactly a defendant must know about death
and about killing before he or she may be criminally blamed for a
homicide. At a minimum, it seems clear that defendant must under-
stand some things about the nature of the harm (s) he inflicted: that
killing someone causes their permanent departure, perhaps. On such
a threshold view defendant is chargeable if (s)he (1) understands that
killing someone ends their life, which means at least that he or she is
gone forever, and (2) that society considers this wrong.
The discussion thus far should alert us to the presence of a
broader issue. As a general matter, we might hypothesize that a per-
son may be found criminally responsible only if (s)he understands the
facts requisite to the harm that motivates the criminal prohibition
(s)he is charged with violating. Thus, murder is criminally prohibited
because killing someone removes the person permanently from the
world and this inflicts a terrible and irreparable loss, not only on the
person killed but also on those attached to and/or dependent on that
person. Defendant must at least understand (1) the fact of the injury,
(2) its permanence, and (3) that inflicting this loss is considered
wrong. There was some evidence that Brandon T. did in fact under-
stand all these things, and under such a standard he could therefore
be held responsible.
It is of course possible to embellish the theory in a way that would
exclude more, or all children from liability, but doing so would neces-
sitate a comparison with the standards of criminal responsibility as ap-
plied to defendants generally. One could argue, for example, that in
order to be held liable for homicide a defendant must know not only
that killing someone is considered wrong and that it removes the per-
son permanently, but that doing this violates rights possessed by the
victim, specifically the right not to be murdered. On this theory it
might well make sense to exempt many or all pre-adolescent children
(certainly children as young as Brandon T.) from liability for homi-
cide on the ground that they are unlikely to understand the process of
and the effect of a victim's death, and are also unlikely to compre-
hend what a "right" is and why society might enforce it. But quite
clearly we do not apply this richer standard when an adult defendant
is charged with homicide. Suppose adult defendant AD is charged
with murder and there is no doubt that AD did the acts that caused
despite hisjuvenility, [ felt that he grasped the essentials of what a trial pro-
ceeding was, why he was going to be tried and what the penalties might be.
Frontline: Little Criminals, supra note 12.
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the victim's (V) death. AD could not defend the murder charge on
the ground (1) that although his killing of V means that V is gone
from the earth and will not return, Vis now in Heaven living with God
and therefore AD's action was justified because he actually conferred
a net benefit on V, or on the ground (2) of AD's (genuine) belief that
people do not, in fact, have a "right" to life or even a right not to be
arbitrarily killed-their continued existence depends solely on their
ability to defend themselves against any and all attacks by others. For
the purpose of prosecuting AD for murder, it would simply not matter
how sincere or well-documented AD's belief in the afterlife, or in the
law of the jungle, happened to be-the law does not inquire, or admit
into its official inquiry, the details of defendant's beliefs in death un-
less those beliefs are otherwise relevant to an already existing excuse
such as insanity. Needless to say, neither of the beliefs described
above would alone merit such an excuse.
C. Other Differences as Basis for the Youth Excuse
Some would argue that whatever the evidence in favor of finding
intent, there are other differences in cognitive, emotional, and social
capacity between children and adults, and these differences are so
great that it is simply unjust for the criminal law to hold children to
the same standard of behavior as adults. This argument is the thrust
of much recent scholarship in the area of juvenile culpability.' 3 In
general, the scholarship focuses on differences between adolescents
and adults, attempting to demonstrate that adolescents are less averse
to risk, more likely to value short-term benefits over long-term costs,
and more likely to be influenced by their social environment than
adults,' 4 and that these differences ought to serve either as a com-
plete bar to criminal liability for juveniles, 1 5 or as a partial bar to such
113 See Brink, supra note 16, at 1557-58; Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 801;
Bazelon, supra note 13, at 162.
114 See, e.g., Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 812-16; id. at 813 ("[E]ven when
adolescent cognitive capacities approximate those of adults, youthful decisionmaking
may still differ due to immature judgment. The psycho-social factors most relevant to
differences in judgment include: (a) peer orientation, (b) attitudes toward and per-
ception of risk, (c) temporal perspectives, and (d) capacity for self-management.
While cognitive capacities shape the process of decisionmaking, immature judgment
can affect outcomes because these developmental factors influence adolescent values
and preferences that drive the cost-benefit calculus in the making of choices.").
115 See, e.g., Brink, supra note 16, at 1585 ("The trend to try juveniles as adults is
inconsistent with retributive, rehabilitative, and deterrent rationales for punishment
and with the related rationales for having a separate system of juvenile justice in the
first place. A sound criminal jurisprudence requires that we stop treating juvenile
offenders as little adults.").
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liability." 6 The scholarship usually draws 
on behavioral studies dem-
onstrating that adolescents as a class have 
weaker future-orientation
than do adults as a class; that they take 
more health and safety risks
than do adults as a class; and that they are 
more impulsive than adults
as a class. 117 These differences, the argument 
concludes, reduce ado-
lescent blameworthiness and (thus) criminal culpability."
8
Most recently this difference-based approach 
has received a pub-
lic relations boost from medical technology. 
To the behavioral studies
demonstrating some differences between 
adolescents and adults with
respect to things like risk taking and 
long term focus are now added
studies of brain function that allegedly 
support those conclusions. Ad-
vances in brain imaging technology 
have allowed researchers to ob-
serve the ways in which the brain changes 
from childhood, through
adolescence, and into adulthood. Studies 
indicate that the brain ma-
tures throughout adolescence, and indeed 
well into adulthoodi'
9 In
particular, recent studies suggest that 
development of the brain's fron-
tal lobe, which is a key factor in regulating 
impulses in adults, is not
complete until some time 
after age twenty one1
20
However, as Professor Morse has correctly 
pointed out, the legal
relevance of such information is far from 
clear.12 1 First, this very same
brain research indicates that brain maturation 
peaks at least several
years beyond age eighteen, the legal 
age of majority. A possible impli-
cation of this finding is that the legal 
age of majority should be raised,
say to twenty-two or twenty-five, by which 
time the brain is more fully
116 See, e.g., Scott & Steinberg, supra note 
16, at 800 (advocating "a model under
which immaturity mitigates responsibility-but 
does not excuse the criminal acts of
youths who are beyond childhood").
117 Id. at 829-30.
118 Id.
119 See, e.g., Gruber & Yurgelun-Todd, supra 
note 36, at 324; Lee Bowman, New
Research Shows Stark Differences in Teen Brains, SCRIPPS HOWARD 
NEWS SERVICE, May 11,
2004 ("In fact, the brain's gray matter has a final growth 
spurt around the ages of
eleven to thirteen in the frontal lobes of the 
brain, the regions that guide human
intellect and planning. But it seems to take 
most of the teen years for youngsters to
link these new cells to the rest of their brains 
and solidify the millions of connections
that allow them to think and behave like adults.").
120 For example, consider a study led by Nitin 
Gogtay of the National Institute of
Mental Health in which researchers performed 
magnetic resonance imaging every
two years on thirteen people between the ages 
of four and twenty-one. The results
indicated that the frontal lobes of the brain were 
the last to develop fully, and that the
brain changes continued up to age twenty-one, the 
oldest age examined. See, e.g.,
Mary Beckman, Crime, Culpability, and the 
Adolescent Brain, 305 SCIENCE 596, 596
(2004).
121 Morse, supra note 48, at 406.
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developed.122 Even further, the studies now trumpeted as demon-
strating "stark differences" between adolescent and adult brains also
show that brain development continues well into a person's forties
and fifties. 123 At what point in a person's brain development does
(s)he become criminally responsible? The studies themselves cannot
answer that question. Instead, they simply expose us to the truth that
ultimately, criminal responsibility is a matter of moral judgment
rather than of scientific fact-finding. 124 Indeed, many scientists warn
against the use of brain imaging technology to determine moral or
legal culpability.1 25 They caution that no existing technology can
prove a causal connection between brain structure and particular be-
havior, and that imaging should not, therefore, be forced into the ser-
vice of assigning, or excluding, any particular person from legal
responsibility. 126
122 Beckman, supra note 120, at 596 ("Some say (brain] growth maxes out at
twenty. Others . . . consider 25 the age at which brain maturation peaks."); see also
Bowman, supra note 119 ("[Slome scientists would put off the age of legal majority to
22 or 23.").
123 Bowman, supra note 119 ("Even in adulthood, the wiringjob is not completely
done. Imaging done on the brains of people in their 40s and 50s show there's an-
other surge of connections being made, perhaps in response to menopause or to
prepare the brain to better compensate for the loss of brain cells as we age.").
124 Professor Morse has made the same point. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 31, at 20
("[A] legally responsible agent is a person who is so generally capable, according to
some contingent, normative notion both of rationality itself and of how much capabil-
ity is required.... These are matters of moral, political, and ultimately, legal judg-
ment, about which reasonable people can and do differ.").
125 See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 119 ("[Rlesearchers say that while it's possible to
gain general understanding about brain development and function from the images,
the notion that medicine, law enforcement or anyone else should work from some
ideal, normal brain model is troubling. 'Each individual is not an exact map, and the
difficulties in determining what the range of variations are is really dangerous. The
data is incredibly easy to be over-interpreted,' said Sonia Miller, a New York attorney
who specializes in cases dealing with new technologies."); see also id. ("Dr. Peter
Bandettini, a brain-imaging researcher at the National Institutes of Health, said the
science of understanding what small structures and chemicals are doing within the
brain is far from a gold standard for mental function or age. 'Right now, I personally
think you'd get more information about a person's mental age by going to a set of
behavioral tests.'").
126 Beckman, supra note 120, at 599 ("'We couldn't do a scan on a kid and decide
if they should be tried as an adult,' [Sowell] says."); see also id. ("Although many re-
searchers agree that the brain, especially the frontal lobe, continues to develop well
into teenhood and beyond, many scientists hesitate to weigh in on the legal debate.
Some, like UJay] Giedd [of the NIMH], say the data 'just aren't there' for them to
confidently testify to the moral or legal culpability of adolescents in court.").
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The fact of difference does not, by itself, mandate 
any particular
moral or legal result. As Professor Morse has explained, 
variations in
ability or behavior between persons do not mandate 
differences in
legal treatment or responsibility. Differences are 
only relevant to the
extent that they impact on a pre-existing standard 
of responsibility.
That standard cannot be dictated by the differences. 
Instead, the dif-
ferences must be measured against the standard 
in order to deter-




Thus, the fact that adolescents and adults may 
be somewhat dif-
ferent in ways that affect their general judgment and decision-making
capacity does not answer the question of whether 
adolescents ought to
be held liable for serious crime. Further, as Morse 
points out:
A substantial minority of adults is similar to mid-to-late 
adoles-
cents on the variables that distinguish the age cohorts 
as classes. As
noted, although the means may significantly differ, 
there is a great
deal of overlap between the distributions. A regrettable 
number of
adults are immature and have dreadful judgment. Yet we do not
excuse that minority of adults. Why, therefore, should 
adolescents
be treated differently? Adults obviously have more 
experience with
the consequences of their behavior and more life 
experience gener-
ally and some mature as a result, but many do 
not. Impulsive or
peer oriented adults probably have always "learned" 
less from expe-
rience than their more mature counterparts. Moreover, 
it does not
take much life experience to understand how killing, 
raping, burn-
ing, stealing, and so on affects others. To understand 
the conse-
quences of these actions does not require the 
sophistication and
moral subtlety that only experience 
can provide. 128
127 See, e.g., Morse, supra note 31, at 49 ("The question of 
juvenile responsibility is
not simply whether juveniles are generally different from adults. 
Surely they are in
many ways. The real issue is whether they are morally 
different, and the resolution of
that issue depends on whether a moral theory we 
accept dictates that the variables
that behaviorally distinguish juveniles should also diminish their 
responsibility."); id.
at 50 ("If responsibility is treated as a matter of retrospective 
moral evaluation, as I
suggested it essentially is and should be, then the 
plasticity or amenability to treat-
ment of a variable is irrelevant to whether 
it diminishes moral responsibility. Respon-
sibility should be mitigated or excused if a variable 
that diminishes responsibility was
operative at the time of harmdoing, whether 
or not this characteristic is alterable, and
vice versa. It is hard to imagine what moral 
theory would suggest that plasticity per se
should reduce responsibility. To the extent 
that fault is a necessary or sufficient con-
dition for full responsibility, plasticity is irrelevant.").
128 Id. at 58. Also see, Norvin Richards, 
Criminal Children, 16 LAW & PHIL. 63
(1997), who rejects arguments that adolescents should be 
presumptively nonculpable
for crime because of their relative lack of 
life experience:
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Of course, it may be the case that some, many, or even most 
chil-
dren lack the necessary capacities to be held guilty of crime. 
But if
this is true, it serves only as an argument for evaluating 
juvenile de-
fendants individually (as we do all other defendants) for the 
purpose
of deciding whether or not they meet the test of 
criminal responsibil-
ity. This question is usually decided during the 
criminal adjudication
process rather than by a bright-line a priori rule 
that bars, or even
presumptively bars, children from criminal responsibility.
Thus, the mainstream literature on juvenile responsibility makes
a core, and erroneous, assumption: that if children 
as a class think
differently from adults as a class, these differences 
ought to matter to
children's criminal responsibility. But this simply 
does not follow. In-
deed, it is hard to see why the mere fact that there 
exist differences in
judgment and decision-making capacity between juveniles and 
adults
is at all relevant to the question of juvenile liability for crime. Instead,
the core questions ought to be, (1) what are the threshold 
capacities
required for criminal liability, and (2) do juveniles have those 
capaci-
ties?129 This inquiry, in turn, has both normative 
and descriptive
dimensions. With respect to the normative dimension-upon 
what
threshold capacities should the law insist before 
holding someone
guilty of a crime?-many different answers are possible, 
and the issue
of differences between juveniles and adults is only derivatively 
rele-
vant. With respect to the descriptive dimension-what 
threshold ca-
pacities does the law in fact insist upon before holding someone
criminally liable?-comparisons between all juveniles and all 
adults
are much less relevant than comparisons between 
juvenile and adult
criminals. To answer the descriptive question what 
we need to know is
not whether juveniles differ from adults but whether adults who 
have
been convicted and punished for committing serious 
crimes differ, as
a class and in relevant ways, from juveniles who have committed 
sub-
stantively identical acts. Surely no one would be 
surprised to discover
that as a group, violent adult felons possess weaker 
future orientation,
are less risk-averse, and are more impulsive 
than either adults or
Take murder, for example. The main thing wrong 
with murdering someone
is that you take this person's life against his 
will. [Adolescents] certainly
know that much about it. Indeed, if they did 
not know they were taking
someone's life against his will they would not 
be guilty of murder at all, but
of some lesser crime .... What we need 
is an extra, additional wrong done
in committing murder, a wrong that adolescents 
do not realize they are do-
ing because they lack experience in life. There 
are no obvious candidates.
Id. at 72-73.
129 See, e.g., supra Part I.A.2.
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juveniles generally."' 0 The harder question is, do violent adult 
offend-
ers demonstrate significantly different levels of future 
orientation, risk
aversion, and impulsivity than do juveniles who commit the same 
of-
fenses? Only if that question can be answered in 
the affirmative might
such differences be allowed to affect the criminal blameworthiness 
of
individuals in either class.
Finally, consider the argument that adolescents may be more 
sus-
ceptible to environmental influence, from peers and 
surrounding so-
cial pressures, and are therefore more likely to feel 
pressured into
criminal acts than are adults.
31 From the perspective of culpability
for crime, this argument seems to cut both ways. 
Ifjuveniles are more
likely to be influenced by the signals from their 
environment, and
they otherwise possess the threshold capacities for 
criminal responsi-
bility, then perhaps the law should focus on 
sending strong anti-
,,criminogenic' t 3 2 signals to the class of potential juvenile offenders.
In this connection, evidence indicates that juvenile offenders 
are
often well aware that the law treats them more 
leniently than it does
adults, and that some are quite willing to take 
advantage of this fact.
Street gangs, for example, actively recruit young 
children for criminal
acts because they know that such children are unlikely 
to be convicted
and punished as criminals.
1 33 And some individual offenders are no
less savvy. Recall the murder by Christopher Simmons, 
which became
the subject on appeal of the Supreme Court's recent holding 
in Roper
v. Simmons,134 that defendants who are under age 
eighteen at the time
130 See, e.g., Morse, supra note 31, at 53 (acknowledging that, 
as a class, adolescents
are less risk-averse, more impulsive, and are more 
susceptible to peer pressure than
adults).
It is crucial to remember, however, that a finding 
of a statistically significant
difference between groups does not mean that 
there is no overlap between
them. In fact, the adolescent and adult distributions 
on these variables over-
lap considerably; large numbers of adolescents 
and adults are indistinguish-
able on measures of these variables.
Id.
131 See, e.g., Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, 
at 832 (" [A] dolescents in high crime
neighborhoods are subject both to unique social pressures that 
induce them to join in
criminal activity and to restrictions on their freedom 
that tangibly limit their ability to
escape. These restrictions are constitutive of a 
well-defined legal status resulting from
youthful dependency that substantially limits 
autonomy.").
132 See, e.g., id. ("[T]hose whom psychologists call normative 
adolescents may well
succumb to the extraordinary pressures of a criminogenic 
social context.").
133 For example, Paul Robinson recounts the case 
of Robert "Yummy" Sandifer,
who joined the "Black Disciples" in Chicago at age eight by explaining: 
"Young mem-
bers like Robert are prized because they are immune 
from detention for more than
30 days." ROBINSON, supra note 52, at 134.
134 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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of their crimes may not be executed.135 Simmons, who was seventeen
at the time of his crime, informed two friends that he wanted to mur-
der someone by breaking into the victim's house, tying the victim up,
and throwing the victim off a bridge. 13 6 According to the account
offered byJustice Kennedy in his majority opinion for the Court, Sim-
mons and one of his friends then selected Shirley Crook as their vic-
tim and carried out their plan to the letter.13 7 Before the murder,
Simmons had confidently informed his friends that they could "get
away with it" because they were juveniles. 138 To the extent that
juveniles are especially sensitive to the criminogenic elements in their
environment, perhaps failing to punish blameworthy adolescent of-
fenders for crime actually adds to the pathological content of that
environment?
Evidence of juvenile responsiveness to environmental influence
raises another core issue-that of corrigibility, or the potential for re-
habilitation among juvenile offenders. That is the subject of Part II,
to which I now turn.
II. THE REDEMPTION THEsIs: PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION
I noted above that the almost universal academic opposition to
juvenile criminal liability is rooted in two widely held intuitions, one
involving children's potential guilt and the other involving their po-
tential redeemability.'3 9 Part I evaluated the Culpability Thesis; in this
Part I examine the Redemption Thesis, the idea that even when the
state can prove the elements of a crime and can show that at the time
of the criminal act a juvenile offender was mentally culpable, it is
wrong to punish juveniles for crime because they have a greater capac-
ity than adults to reform and become productive, non-offending
citizens.
135 Id. at 569.
136 Id. at 556.
137 Id. at 556-57. ("Using duct tape to cover her eyes and mouth and bind her
hands, the two perpetrators put Mrs. Crook in her minivan and drove to a state park.
They reinforced the bindings, covered her head with a towel, and walked her to a
railroad trestle spanning the Meramec River, There they tied her hands and feet
together with electrical wire, wrapped her whole face in duct tape and threw her from
the bridge, drowning her in the waters below.").
138 Id. at 556.
139 See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
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A. Culpability v. Corrigibility
Opponents of juvenile liability argue that "only a relatively small
proportion of adolescents who experiment in risky 
or illegal activities
develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior 
that persist into
adulthood. Thus, predicting the development 
of relatively more per-
manent and enduring traits on the basis of 
risky behavior patterns
observed in adolescence is an uncertain business."
1 40 Once again, this
addresses the wrong question. It is certainly true 
that most risk taking
juveniles turn out to be productive and law abiding adults. 
But this
fact alone does not justify excluding juveniles as a class from 
criminal
responsibility. Instead, we must first answer 
a much more relevant
question: What percentage of violent juvenile offenders-juveniles
who have killed someone, or seriously attempted 
to do so, or have
committed armed robbery or assault and battery 
on another person-
turn their lives around and become peaceful 
and law abiding adults?
If virtually all such juveniles do so, then a persuasive case 
might be
made for sentencing juvenile cases on a treatment, rather than 
a pun-
ishment, model. If, on the other hand, most 
such juvenile offenders
continue to inflict serious harms on society until 
they are stopped by
force from doing so, then the redemption-based 
case for exempting
juveniles from punishment becomes much 
weaker.1 41
It should be clear that a defendant's corrigibility-the 
relative
ease with which an offender or class of offenders 
might turn their lives
around-cannot determine a defendant's culpability 
for an act already
140 Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 819-20.
141 See, e.g., Benjamin B. Lahey et al., Relation of Age of Onset 
to the Type and Severity
of Child and Adolescent Conduct Problems, 27 J. ABNORMAL CHILD 
PSYCHOL. 247, 247
(1999) ("Numerous researchers have reported a robust inverse 
relation between the
age of a youth's first conviction and his or her total 
number of convictions through
early adulthood. Youths who are first convicted 
earlier are convicted more times not
only because they began their 'criminal careers' 
earlier but also because they are con-
victed at higher rates at all ages into early adulthood. 
It is important to note that the
same inverse association has been found between 
age of onset and self-reported delin-
quent behavior in several community samples. This 
is important, as self-reports of
delinquency avoid the biases in detection, prosecution, 
and conviction that are inher-
ent in official statistics." (citations omitted)); id. at 248 ("Moffitt 
coined the terms
S'adolescent-limited' and 'life-course persistent' delinquency for these two groups 
of
youths. She hypothesized that youths who first 
engage in antisocial behavior during
childhood do so for different reasons than youths 
who first engage in antisocial be-
havior during adolescence.... [Although it should not 
be regarded as a closed ques-
tion], the notion that there is an inverse relation between 
the age of onset of
antisocial behavior and the severity and persistence 
of antisocial behavior has had a
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done. 42 But corrigibility and culpability are often confused in this
context-even by the United States Supreme Court, which declared in
Roper v. Simmons that "[fjrom a moral standpoint it would be mis-
guided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a
greater possibility exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be
reformed."1 43 But this must be wrong. To the extent that a defen-
dant's personal blameworthiness informs our decision about her crim-
inal guilt for an already completed act-and few would deny that it
does' 4 4-the likelihood of future criminal actions (or law abidingness)
cannot decide the liability issue. Ultimately, the decision as to liability
rests on our judgments about the person's mental culpability at the
time he or she did the act charged; mental culpability, in turn, centers
on what the person understood, desired, and was capable of doing at
that moment in time or during preparations beforehand. Thus, statis-
tics purporting to show that young children in general are more ame-
nable to treatment than adults, or that most adolescents grow out of
the tendency to engage in impulsive or risky behavior, add nothing to
the general debate about the elements of liability.
But this should not drive the issue of redemptive potential from
the criminal process altogether. Although corrigibility cannot answer
the question of liability for crime, it may well influence the decision as
to how much punishment a convicted criminal should receive. This
seems an avenue worth exploring, not least because if the discussion
in Part I of this Article is correct, mens rea offers only a very unstable
142 See, e.g., Morse, supra note 31, at 50 ("If responsibility is treated as a matter of
retrospective moral evaluation, as I suggested it essentially is and should be, then the
plasticity or amenability to treatment of a variable is irrelevant to whether it dimin-
ishes moral responsibility. Responsibility should be mitigated or excused if a variable
that diminishes responsibility was operative at the time of harmdoing, whether or not
this characteristic is alterable, and vice versa. It is hard to imagine what moral theory
would suggest that plasticity per se should reduce responsibility.").
143 Rope; 543 U.S. at 570.
144 See, e.g., Morse, supra note 31, at 16-17 ("1 make the assumption, which is
almost universally shared in Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence, that desert
based on moral fault is at least a necessary pre-condition for just punishment. If
youths are to be adjudicated and punished like adults, it is therefore crucial to ad-
dress the desert of youthful offenders."); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 800
("The starting point [of our argument] is the principle of penal proportionality,
which is the foundation of any legitimate system of state punishment. Proportionality
holds that fair criminal punishment is measured not only by the amount of harm
caused or threatened by the actor, but also by his blameworthiness."); Franklin E.
Zimring, Penal Proportionality for the Young Offender: Notes on Immaturity, Capacity, and
Diminished Responsibility, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 11, at 271, 272 ("A host of
subjective elements affect judgments of deserved punishment even though the victim
is just as dead in each different case.").
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bar to criminal liability. If children may only be excluded from crimi-
nal punishment to the extent that they are unable to form intent,
then only very young children-younger than six-year-old Brandon
T.-may be categorically excluded. But to a significant degree, our
uneasiness about punishing children for crime rests not on the intui-
tion that children are incapable of intentional action, but on the intui-
tive judgment that children are more easily reformed than adults-
that to send someone to prison for life for an act, even a monstrous
act, committed while a juvenile is to waste a life that might well have
been productive if allowed to grow to adulthood outside of prison. 145
B. Should Corrigibility Affect Punishment?
From the discussion above we can import the interim principle
that a defendant's capacity for rehabilitation enters the equation once
culpability has been established and the law is seeking to resolve the
question of punishment. "Is this person criminally responsible for
what he did?" is quite a different question from: "Should we punish
this person for what he did?" Our collective answer to that second
question has undergone dramatic changes over the past century.
The recent punitive turn toward juveniles in the criminal law, de-
rives its core energy not from statistical differences between children
and adults, but from a sea change in our beliefs about crime and
criminals generally. The system ofjuvenile justice arose only seconda-
rily because of children's perceived "differences;" its primary source of
inspiration was a view of human nature that could hardly be more
different from the view that now dominates our system of criminal
punishment.
1. The Reign of Redemption
The change is evident in the title of Frank Allen's well known
book, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal.146 A century ago, belief in
the criminal law as an agent of redemption reigned; that belief has
now virtually disappeared from the practices of the criminal law. 147
And the decline of that ideal in general may explain the criminal law's
punitive turn toward children in particular.
145 As Stephen Morse points out, on a purely retributive theory of punishment this
might not matter. Morse, supra note 31, at 50. But on a mixed theory, under which
both retributive and utilitarian concerns enter into the kind and degree of criminal
punishment inflicted-the likelihood of reform might be a valid or even important
factor on the utilitarian side of the calculus. Id. at 50-51.
146 FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHARILITATIVE IDEAL (1981).
147 Id. at 32-33.
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More than two decades ago, Frank Allen foresaw this trend and
made it the basis for his Storrs Lectures at Yale. Allen wrote: "Al-
though judgments may vary about precisely how far support for reha-
bilitative theories of penal treatment has eroded . . . the central fact
appears inescapable: the rehabilitative ideal has declined in the
United States: the decline has been substantial, and it has been pre-
cipitous."' 48 Allen contrasts that decline with the near universal en-
dorsement of that ideal, by lawmakers, courts, reformers, and the
academy, at the beginning of the twentieth century.14 9 In their book
Reaffirming Rehabilitation,1 50 authors Francis T. Cullen and Karen E.
Gilbert trace the belief in rehabilitation to the rise of the Progressive
movement in the United States in the early 1900s.1 5 1 The Progressives
united strong opposition to retributivism 15 2 with a transcendent opti-
mism about the possibilities of a just state and-particularly relevant
here-of redeeming criminals via treatment rather than punishment.
Cullen and Gilbert wrote:
The flavor of the Progressives' perspective is well illustrated in
these 1912 remarks by Warren F. Spaulding, Secretary of the Massa-
chusetts Prison Association: "Each criminal is an individual, and
should be treated as such.... Character and not conduct is the only
sound basis of treatment. Fundamental in the new scheme is ...
individualism. In the old system, the main question was, What did
he do? The main question should be, What is he? There can be no
148 Id. at 10.
149 Id. at 5 ("Appreciation of the decline of the rehabilitative ideal in the 1970s
requires an accurate understanding of its dominance in the United States for most of
the twentieth century."). Among other examples, Allen notes the U.S. Supreme
Court holding in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), declaring that
"'[r]etribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation
and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurispru-
dence."' ALLFN, supra note 146, at 5 (quoting Williams, 337 U.S. at 248). Allen adds,
"There can be no doubt that Justice Black's dictum expressed the enlightened opin-
ion, not only of the judiciary, but also of the public at large." Id.
150 FRANCIS T. CULLEN & KAREN E. GILBERT, REAFFIRMING REHABILITATION (1982).
151 Id. at 73-81.
152 Id. at 75-76 ("At the turn of the century, Charlton T. Lewis voiced sentiments
that would be echoed repeatedly in the years to come when he asserted that '[t]he
method of apportioning penalties according to degrees of guilt implied by defined
offenses is as completely discredited, and is as incapable of a part of any reasoned
system of social organization, as is the practice of astrology or ... witchcraft.'" (quot-
ing Charlton T. Lewis, The Indeterminate Sentence, 9 YALE L.J. 17, 18 (1889))). Lewis
prophesied, "the time will come when the moral mutilations of fixed terms of impris-
onment will seem as barbarous and antiquated as the ear-lopping, nose-slitting and
head amputations of a century ago." Lewis, supra, at 29.
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intelligent treatment until more is known than the fact that a man
did a certain thing. It is as important to know why he did it."' s3
As Cullen and Gilbert explain, the Progressives' belief in individ-
ualized treatment had a profound impact on the criminal law:
(T] he Progressives succeeded in a major renovation of the criminal
justice system. Within the space of two decades, their innovations
reformulated sentencing practices in the direction of indetermi-
nacy, established the new bureaucratic structures of probation and
parole, created a separate system ofjuvenile justice, introduced wide dis-
cretionary powers throughout the legal process, and reaffirmed the
vitality of the rehabilitative idea. At the end of their era, nearly all
of the elements of the criminal justice system familiar to today's stu-
dents of crime control were securely in place. Of equal significance,
the Progressives bequeathed a powerful rationale for the individual-
ized treatment of offenders that would dominate American correc-
tional policy until very recent times. 15 4
Note the implication: The non-punitive, treatment focused juve-
nile justice system was not created in isolation from the criminal jus-
tice process for adults, but merely as one part of the Progressives'
general plan to restructure the criminal law around the goal of reha-
bilitation. Cullen and Gilbert wrote that "the Progressives' therapeu-
tic model received its most complete expression in the measures
formulated to control delinquent behavior."'155 The juvenile justice
system was just one manifestation-albeit a very important one-of a
widespread redemption-oriented ideology, an ideology that "received
its most complete expression" in the non-punitive treatment of youth-
ful offenders.' 56
2. The Origin of Separation
But then what, on the Progressive model, explains the actual sep-
aration of juvenile offenders, and their separate treatment by the
criminal law? Despite the widespread popularity of the redemptive
approach in the early and mid-twentieth century, adult offenders were
never actually exempted from criminal guilt and punishment; only
juveniles were.
153 CULLEN & GILBERT, supra note 150, at 77 (alteration in original) (emphasis
added) (quoting Warren F. Spaulding, The Treatment of Ciime-Past, Present, Future, 3J.
AM. INsT. Cim~. L. & CRIMINOLOcy 376, 378 (1912)).
154 Id. at 81 (emphasis added).
155 Id. at 80.
156 Id.
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To some extent this difference in treatment of juveniles and
adults simply reflected the limits of the politically possible rather than
any core difference in punishment rationales. The Progressives envi-
sioned a system under which punishment would take a back seat to
rehabilitation for all criminal offenders, but even during the heyday
of this vision the pull of retribution was strong enough to prevent the
replacement of punishment with treatment for everyone.' 57
It also seems true, however, that the fundamental principle un-
derlying Progressive reform proposals for the criminal law generally-
that is, their belief in the redemptive potential of all human beings-
does suggest a basis for distinguishing between adults and juveniles
within a general framework of a corrections policy oriented toward
rehabilitation. If (as the Progressives believed) humans generally
have the capacity for redemption, and if that capacity justifies a thera-
peutic (as opposed to retributive) system of criminal sentencing, then
youthful offenders may have an even stronger case for treatment, and
against punishment, than do adults as a group. Remember that with
respect to the question of criminal culpability, the scholarship argues
that children lack relevant capacities, such as the ability to form intent,
or maturity of judgment. That lack, it is contended, ought to absolve
them from criminal responsibility, or at least diminish their responsi-
bility, for crime.'15 8 But when we move to the issue of punishment, the
children's rights argument takes on the opposite thrust. Children, it
is argued, have a greater capacity than adults in at least one area-the
capacity for change. Children are in process, are acutely susceptible
to environmental influences and such influences can greatly affect
their ultimate choices, behavior, and moral convictions. If even adult
criminal offenders have significant capacity for reform and rehabilita-
tion (as the Progressives believed), then it seems to follow that chil-
dren must possess such capacity to a greater, and perhaps to a much
greater, degree.
C. Age and Corrigibility
It is tempting to conclude that even if children are sometimes
responsible for crime, it might not be good policy to punish them, or
at least to punish them as much as we do adults. On the widely ac-
cepted assumptions that (1) the state should limit the amount of de-
157 See, e.g., id, at 81 ("The Progressives' version of a criminal justice system fully
dedicated to the rehabilitation of criminal offenders was never achieved. While the
framework of a therapeutic state had been erected, the substance in many instances
was lacking.").
158 See supra Part I.A.2.
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liberate suffering it inflicts on people to that amount 
that achieves its
legitimate policy goals and no more, and that (2) one of the most 
im-
portant goals of punishment is that of specific 
deterrence, children's
greater redemptive potential may justify lesser punishment 
for the
crimes they commit.
But is it true that children as a class do, in fact, 
have more re-
demptive potential than do adults as a class? 
Some recent research
indicates that this intuition may be baseless-that 
some youthful of-
fenders, particularly those who begin committing 
serious crimes as
young children, may be quite difficult, or even 
impossible, to rehabili-
tate. As one recent article summarized the problem:
Numerous researchers have reported a robust inverse 
relation
between the age of a youth's first conviction and 
his or her total
number of convictions through early adulthood. 
Youths who are
first convicted earlier are convicted more times 
not only because
they began their "criminal careers" earlier but 
also because they are
convicted at higher rates at all ages into early 
adulthood. It is im-
portant to note that the same inverse association 
has been found
between age of onset and self-reported delinquent 
behavior in sev-
eral community samples. This is important, as 
self-reports of delin-
quency avoid the biases in detection, prosecution, 
and conviction
that are inherent in official statistics. Among 
11- through 18-year-
old boys who had engaged in any delinquent behavior, 
Tolan found
that the half of the sample with younger ages 
of onset (<12 years)
reported higher levels of almost all types of 
delinquent behaviors
during adolescence than the half of the sample 
with later ages of
onset. Similarly, in a subset of female and male 
youths from the...
National Youth Survey, Tolan and Thomas found 
that youths who
reported first engaging in delinquent acts before 
age 12 were more
likely to engage in serious offenses and to continue 
to engage in
delinquent behavior during the 3 years following 
the onset of delin-
quent behavior.
1 59
Such findings, indicating "an inverse relation 
between age of onset
and the frequency, seriousness, and persistence 
of delinquency,"1 60 re-
159 Lahey et al., supra note 141, at 247 (citations omitted).
160 Id.; see also Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited 
and Life-Course-Persistent Antiso-
cial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. 
REv. 674, 690 (1993) (discussing
the tendency of some adolescents over others 
to continue their delinquent behavior
into adulthood). Professor Lahey credits Moffitt with coining 
the terms "adolescent-
limited" and "life-course persistent" to describe 
two quite different developmental
pathways of delinquent activity and goes on to explain:
Mouths who first engage in antisocial behavior 
during childhood do so for
different reasons than youths who first engage 
in antisocial behavior during
adolescence. Specifically, childhood-onset conduct 
problems result from
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inforce one intuition that seems to fuel the punitive turn of the crimi-
nal law toward juveniles-that there are in fact "Bad Seeds," who show
their criminal proclivities early, have little or no capacity for remorse
or reform, and who will continue to inflict harm on society until the
criminal law puts them out of commission. Individual cases in which
very young children commit atrocious crimes may reinforce this
impression. 161
According to psychiatrist Martin Blinder, six-year-old Brandon T.
was clearly in danger of becoming a "life-course persistent" of-
fender.1 62 For Dr. Blinder-who evaluated Brandon to determine his
competency to stand trial for the assault on Ignacio Bermudez-the
signs were so marked in Brandon that, despite his youth, Blinder felt
confident in diagnosing him as a "psychopath in the making."' 63 Con-
sider this exchange between Dr. Blinder and an interviewer for the
television program Frontline:
Q: [W] hat were your first impressions of [Brandon T.]?
Blinder: My first impression was a perfectly ordinary, smiling,
outgoing young man. There was nothing about his demeanor or
his appearance to suggest that we were dealing with either a danger-
early neuropsychological deficits that cause cognitive delays, impulsivity, and
difficult temperament. In the presence of adverse childrearing environ-
ments, these characteristics contribute to the origins of conduct problems.
In contrast, the adolescent-onset group does not have predisposing neurop-
sychological dysfunction. Their delinquent behavior arises through the imi-
tation of some of the nonaggressive antisocial behaviors of youths with
childhood onsets. They do so during adolescence because it is a period of
heightened peer influence and conflict regarding adult privileges.
Lahey et al., supra note 141, at 248.
161 See, e.g., the case of Robert Sandifer, who at age eleven murdered two teenaged
gang rivals. RoBINSON, supra note 52, at 134. Of Sandifer's childhood, Paul Robin-
son writes:
Robert's direction of development shows itself early. During a hospital stay
when he is not yet 3, a social worker says something that angers him. He
grabs a toy knife and charges the woman, screaming "Fuck you, you bitch."
He jabs the rubber knife into the woman's arm, saying "I'm going to cut
you.
His first officially recforded offense, at age 9, is an armed robbery.
By age 11, [Yummy Sandifer] has compiled a rap sheet of 28 crimes, all but
five of which are felonies. His short detentions become less frequent when,
because of his violence toward other detained children, Family Services ref-
uses to accept even temporary custody.
Id. at 134-35.
162 Frontline: Little Criminals, supra note 12.
163 Id.
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ous fellow, or one who was wrestling with mental retardation or
some obviously disabling psychiatric disorder.
Q: And following your examination, what diagnosis did you ar-
rive at?
Blinder: I felt that he was a psychopath in the making. We tend
to reserve such a label for adults and we talk about juveniles who act
out in violent ways as suffering a conduct disorder. The use of the
term psychopath or antisocial personality is perhaps prematurely
pejorative and we don't ordinarily see the necessary signs and symp-
toms in one so young and someone so small. So we don't use that
terms [sic] . . .when we talk about juveniles. I certainly have never
used that term before. But this young man was so evidently suffused
with all of the findings, that, when they fully blossomed later in life,
will call for this diagnosis, that I was comfortable in talking about
him having a nascent sociopathic personality. Or a psychopath in
the making. 16
4
164 Interview with Dr. Martin Blinder, Forensic Psychiatrist, available at http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/little/interviews/blinderl.html. Asked
to speculate about Brandon T.'s probable future, Dr. Blinder's prognosis was grim:
I can say that the personality characteristics that I found in this young boy,
that seemed to drive him, and the absence of any inhibiting factors, the ab-
sence of empathy for his fellow kid and some of the other diagnostic features
[that] are so common in individuals who do go forward in a life of violence
and a life of crime, that I think we should have a great concern that we will
indeed be faced with what to do with this fellow on down the road....
When he has his freedom and he has a bit of heft to him, I think statistically
there is some likelihood that he will act in a criminal fashion. Whether or
not. . . this young man will definitively grow up to be John Dillinger, I can't
say. But I think had I examined John Dillinger when he was 6 years old, I
would have seen qualities very much like what I saw in this young man.
Id.
Asked "what can be done with a 6-year-old like this?", Dr. Blinder's response was no
more hopeful:
What do you do with a 6-year-old like this? One thing that works is that you
sequester them. So that they no longer have the society to attack. There are
obviously a variety of ethical, moral and psychological reasons why this may
not be a good or a permanent solution. But it's very tempting. To make
sure that they don't have the opportunity to do the kind of damage that we
know they are capable of. They are, at least theoretically, responsive to long-
term psychotherapeutic intervention.... The problem, to me, stems from
my conviction that in this sort of character disorder-and certainly a charac-
ter disorder of this early severity-it is probably largely genetic. Yes, cer-
tainly, being raised in a violent neighborhood and in a violent or less than
optimum home... these things are not therapeutic.... But if it brings to
the table, if you will, a certain genetic structure, it's very difficult to modify
that through behavioral or psychotherapeutic techniques.
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It may, in short, be true that at least some juvenile offenders-
those who begin committing serious crimes while children and who
demonstrate neither empathy toward others nor remorse for the
harm they inflict-may be difficult or impossible to rehabilitate. And
this may be true although such youngsters are not legally insane; al-
though they may appear to be normal in many ways; and although
they may understand that society condemns their actions and that, if
caught, the consequences of those actions could be extremely
unpleasant.
To the extent this is correct, it becomes more difficult to justify a
system of juvenile justice that treats all children as non-responsible
and/or as non-punishable. Such a system makes the conscious deter-
mination to allow youthful defendants who intentionally commit seri-
ous crimes to remain outside the system of criminal punishment solely
because of their age. And that decision requires a stronger justifica-
tion than has yet been offered to support it-especially because a sys-
tem under which children are evaluated individually, and the decision
to punish them is made individually, would seem to be a more rational
method of balancing the legitimate interests of youthful defendants
against society's need for protection from violent offenders of any age.
This conclusion follows whatever the ultimate source, or cause, of
a particular juvenile's criminal behavior. Because children are so visi-
bly under the control of adults, we tend to excuse their bad behavior
on the ground that the adults in their lives-or the societal environ-
ment in which they grow up-are the parties "really" responsible for
their acts.165 But even setting aside the criminal law's general dislike
of assigning vicarious responsibility for crime, this approach proves
too much. A substantial, perhaps an overwhelming, percentage of
adults convicted of serious crimes such as murder, rape, and aggra-
vated assault, suffered significant abuse as children and could persua-
sively argue that the abuse is causally related to their criminal actions
as adults. If we excuse children from punishment on the ground that
they have suffered from abuse, then we are intellectually compelled to
consider the identical argument in a case involving a severely abused
adult for whom the abuse is at least a but-for cause of the crimes with
which he is charged.
Id. Psychopaths are specifically excluded, in the Model Penal Code and state criminal
codes, from eligibility for the insanity defense on grounds of psychopathy. See, e.g.,
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (1962) (excluding psychopaths from successfully ad-
vancing the insanity defense solely on grounds of psychopathy); see also TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 8.01 (b) (Vernon 2003) (excluding abnormality manifested only by crim-
inal or antisocial behavior from the insanity defense).
165 See supra notes 112-14, 128 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Consider the argument thus far. First, Part I concluded that the
longstanding basis for excluding juveniles as a class from criminal lia-
bility-that children and adolescents as a class are incapable, or are
less capable, than adults of forming criminal intent-is not true. Us-
ing the case of Brandon T. as a core example, I argued that even
young children can and do commit terrible crimes while possessing
the threshold capacities necessary for criminal responsibility. From
this perspective, the recent trend in the law-its increasing refusal to
insulate all juveniles, merely because of age, from criminal responsi-
bility-is not irrational; on the contrary, it simply acknowledges that
the concept of mens rea, as it has been descriptively applied in our
criminal law, contains no internal bar to criminal responsibility for
children.
In Part 1I, assuming the potential for culpability, I explored the
most important basis for excluding juveniles from criminal punish-
ment-namely, that juveniles as a class have a greater capacity for re-
demption than adults as a class. I discussed recent evidence
indicating that at least some juveniles-those who lack empathy, are
not remorseful for the harms they inflict, and begin violent lives of
crime before age twelve-may be difficult or impossible to rehabili-
tate. Once again, if this is true then the punitive turn toward juveniles
appears rational. It seems rational to acknowledge (1) that such per-
sons deserve punishment, and (2) that society has a strong interest in
funneling them through the criminal process, to the extent of incar-
cerating them for long periods in order to prevent them from in-
flicting further harm on innocent victims. Moreover, representing
such incarceration as punishment rather than as treatment could have
anti-criminogenic effects on violent juveniles and/or on juvenile risk-
taking generally. 166
166 Thus, for "adolescent-limited" offenders, whose behavior is marked by, and
motivated by, life-stage specific concerns such as peer influence and increased taste
for risk, criminal sentencing might focus on maximizing the potential for redemp-
tion. For "life-course-persistent" offenders, society's interest in self-protection might
dictate the infliction of more suffering, either because stronger tactics are required to
turn such juveniles around, or because we are prepared to acknowledge that rehabili-
tation is impossible in some cases; that some young offenders will continue to inflict
harm unless they are permanently removed from society. Of course it may often be
difficult-in some cases it might even be impossible-to tell with certainty which
juveniles are redeemable and which are not. Even if we begin the inquiry by acknowl-
edging that some young offenders will end as psychopaths, and even if we have an
inkling about who they might be, the law should reach a very high level of certainty
about such things before incarcerating a teenager for life.
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Why, then, do most of us still cringe at the thought of sending a
six-year-old to prison, or to execution-even for an admittedly horren-
dous and intentional act? It is not because children can't act inten-
tionally; they can. It is not only because children are more
redeemable than adults; not all are, it would seem; and if most are,
there is still the question of desert, of culpability for the act done,
whatever one hopes for reform in the future. We can hope that clear-
ing away the debris left by the failed Culpability and Redemption the-
ses will not have the effect of sending numberless troubled children to
prison, but will instead lead to a deeper exploration of the widespread
intuition that, despite the fact that they can do horrible and intention-
ally harmful acts, children should not be punished criminally, at least
to the same degree and in the same way as adults.
What explains the enduring strength of that intuition? I want to
suggest one possible answer. It's an answer that the law should take
seriously because it addresses a core tension in the way the law itself
treats children, and thus invites a specifically legal response.
Consider, on the one hand, the law's general attitude toward the
rights and status of children. Although the law of crime prohibits
adults from torturing children or subjecting them to abuse, the law
also affirmatively, and vigorously, enforces the rights of parents to di-
rect the rearing, physical care, education, discipline, and external en-
vironment of their children. 6 7 Thus, assuming no evidence of
parental abuse, children normally have no legal recourse when their
parents decide to divorce, move, change their children's school, disci-
pline their children, direct their religious education, or monitor their
social lives. The law-the United States Constitution itself-defends
parents' rights to make such decisions, 168 and thus enforces the con-
167 See, e.g., James Dwyer, "Parents'Religion and Children's Welare: Debunking the Doc-
trine of Parents'Rights," 82 CAL. L. REv. 1371, 1372 (1994) ("For those who would have
the State use its power and resources to improve the lives of children, parental rights
constitute the greatest legal obstacle to government intervention to protect children
from harmful parenting practices and to state efforts to assume greater authority over
the care and education of children. Legal commentators, whatever their views on the
proper distribution of child-rearing authority between parents and the State, univer-
sally assume that parents should have some rights with respect to the raising of their
children." (footnote omitted)). My thanks to Professor Dwyer for comments that
helped clarify the thinking in this section.
168 The Supreme Court has affirmed the rights of parents in a long line of deci-
sions beginning in the 1920s. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982)
("The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and man-
agement of their child is protected by the 14th Amendment, and does not evaporate
simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of
their child to the State."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (noting
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finement of children to their families until the 
age of majority. No
other group of (unconvicted and uncommitted) persons is thus 
invol-
untarily subordinated, by law, to the power and 
authority of other
individuals.
At the same time it enforces the control of children 
by the family,
the law-as this Article makes clear-increasingly 
treats children as
autonomous adults for the purposes of criminal 
conviction and pun-
ishment. A strong argument can be made that this 
is both profoundly
contradictory and patently unjust. Substantial empirical evidence 
sup-
ports the widespread intuition that most children 
who commit violent
crimes come from backgrounds featuring core environmental 
and re-
source deficits as well as serious abuse and/or deprivation 
within their
families.' 69 As noted, absent evidence of serious 
abuse, the law en-
forces the confinement of children to those families. 
Unlike adult
criminals who, whatever their sufferings as children 
are not, by defini-
tion, living in legally-enforced subjection to their parents at the 
time
of their crimes, children of poverty-that is, most 
children who com-
mit violent offenses-have been prematurely and 
often continuously
exposed to environments that make it all but impossible 
for such chil-
dren to internalize the values implicit in the criminal 
law and to adopt
those values as their own. It seems unjust, in that context, 
to hold
children-especially young children who have had 
the least opportu-
that custody, care, and nurture of children reside 
first in the parents, "[a]nd it is in
recognition of this that these decisions have respected 
the private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter."); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)
(noting that the Constitution protects liberty of parents and 
guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their 
control); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment 
protects rights of par-
ents to direct education of their children).
169 See, e.g., Patrick F. Fagan, "The Real Root Causes 
of Violent Crime: The Breakdown of
Marriage, Family, and Community" 1 (Heritage Found., Backgrounder 
No. 1026 (1995),
available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Crime/BG1026.cfm 
("A review of the
empirical evidence in the professional literature 
of the social sciences gives policy-
makers an insight into the root causes of crime. 
Consider, for instance: Over the past
thirty years, the rise in violent crime parallels 
the rise in families abandoned by fa-
thers. High-crime neighborhoods are characterized 
by high concentrations of fami-
lies abandoned by fathers. State-by-state analysis 
by Heritage scholars indicates that a
10 percent increase in the percentage of children 
living in single-parent homes leads
typically to a 17 percent increase in juvenile crime. The rate of 
violent teenage crime
corresponds with the number of families abandoned 
by fathers. The type of aggres-
sion and hostility demonstrated by a future criminal 
often is foreshadowed in unusual
aggressiveness as early as age five or six .... 
On the other hand: • . . Even in high-
crime inner-city neighborhoods, well over 90 
percent of children from safe, stable
homes do not become delinquents. By contrast 
only 10 percent of children from
unsafe, unstable homes in these neighborhoods 
avoid crime.").
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nity to perceive and make use of any exit options available-fully re-
sponsible as criminals, even for violent acts that inflict significant
harm.
Significantly, this is not a concern rooted in psychological or be-
havioral differences between children, or adolescents, and adults.
Whatever differences in ability, temperament, or proclivities separate
children from adults, it is almost certainly true that some children,
even pre-adolescent children, do possess the capacity to form intent,
do have a threshold understanding of the harm they intend to inflict,
and do possess the ability to assemble the means and execute on a
plan to commit that harm. Holding such children criminally responsi-
ble is not unjust because of any innate internal differences between
children and adults-but because of the different treatment of chil-
dren by the law, the law's confinement of children to criminogenic
situations from which those children, unlike adults, have little or no
opportunity to escape. The law contributes to the predicament in
which they grow up, and the law, therefore, should acknowledge that
contribution by making it relevant to the question of criminal respon-
sibility when the defendant is a child.
Other defenses of the "youth excuse" are of course possible; a full
exploration of such arguments is not possible here. If this Article has
offered a rational account of the national trend toward making
juveniles liable for crime and punishing them seriously for serious
crime, then it would seem that the traditional grounds for the "separa-
tion thesis"-the idea that children should be segregated from adults
for the purpose of adjudicating crime and deciding punishment-
have broken down under the pressure of the undeniable truth that
children do commit terrible crimes and that the prospects for re-
deeming at least some juvenile criminals may well be just as grim as
the prospects of redeeming adults. If so, and to the extent we still
seek separate and less punitive treatment for juvenile offenders,
other-and more persuasive-grounds must be found on which to
base such separation. But the rationale supporting that must begin by
acknowledging that neither the doctrinal elements of the criminal law
nor the redemptive rationale for imposing punishment erect struc-
tural bars to convicting and punishing children for crime.
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